

JAMES TIFT CHAMPLIN

A Memorial



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JAMES TIFT CHAMPLIN

A Memorial

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Colby College

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ACCORDING TO THE GRACE OF GOD WHICH WAS GIVEN UNTO ME, AS A WISE MASTER-BUILDER I LAID A FOUNDATION.

1 Corinthians iii. 10, Revised Version.

ONE WHO NEVER TURNED HIS BACK, BUT MARCHED BREAST FORWARD,
NEVER DOUBTED CLOUDS WOULD BREAK.

Robert Browning.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

BY

HENRY S. BURRAGE, D.D.

JAMES TIFT CHAMPLIN.

Two thoughts (2 Tim iv. 7) were present with the Apostle Paul as he came to the close of his long and eventful career; first, that his had been a well-spent life, and second, that throughout his Christian course he had never relinquished his personal faith in Christ. All along the ages, from the time of the apostle, there have been others, disciples of the same Master, who could say, "I have completed the glorious contest, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith." They are the men who with an untiring energy have labored as did Paul for the higher interests of mankind; and who like him, in all their Christian way, have proved faithful to their divine Savior and Lord. Of such was James Tift Champlin.

He was a son of John and Martha (Armstrong) Champlin, and was born in Colchester, Connecticut, June 9, 1811. Soon after his birth his parents removed to Lebanon, in the same state, where he spent his boyhood and youth on his father's farm. When about fourteen years of age he united with the Baptist church in Lebanon. The desire for a collegiate training at length took possession of him, and in the autumn of 1828, when a little more than seventeen years of age, he repaired to Colchester Academy, where he entered upon a course of preparation for college under Preceptor

Otis. His studies were continued at Plainfield Academy, under Preceptor Witter.

In September, 1830, he was admitted to the Freshman class in Brown University. Dr. Wayland had entered upon his duties as president of the university in February, 1827, and his strong personality made an abiding impression upon the young student. "I greatly admired the man," was his testimony in his later years, "and received a great impulse from his life, his teachings, and especially from his sermons in the church, and his short, pithy addresses to the students in the chapel." At the graduation of his class in 1834, he delivered an oration on "The Philosopher and the Philanthropist Compared," with the valedictory addresses. Among his classmates were Hon. J. R. Bullock, afterward governor of Rhode Island, and Rev. Silas Bailey, D.D., president of Granville College, now Denison University, at Granville, Ohio, and later president of Franklin College, at Franklin, Indiana.

A few months before he received his degree, Mr. Champlin was elected principal of the Manual Labor school at Pawtuxet, Rhode Island, near Providence. But the position was not an agreeable one, and in a few months he returned to the university as a resident graduate. In September, 1835, he was appointed a tutor in the university, and retained the office until March, 1838. Rev. J. S. Maginnis, D.D., in the preceding year, had resigned the pastorate of the First Baptist Church in Portland, Maine, in order to accept the professorship of biblical theology in the Seminary at Hamilton, New York. He suggested Tutor Champlin as a suitable candidate for the vacancy, and the latter

came to Portland, and preached in the old church on Federal Street the first two Sundays in January, 1838. Correspondence followed, and February 5, 1838, the church voted unanimously to extend a call to Mr. Champlin. The society concurred on the following day. Mr. Champlin preferred not to decide the question of duty in reference to this call until he had become better acquainted with the people among whom he was invited to labor. After spending several weeks in Portland he addressed a letter, April 11, to the committee of the church, announcing his acceptance of the call; and having been received to membership April 30, from the Baptist church in Lebanon, Connecticut, Mr. Champlin was ordained in Portland, May 3, 1838. At this service Dr. Dwight of Portland read the ~~Scriptures~~ and offered prayer; President Pattison of Waterville preached the sermon; Rev. Adam Wilson of Portland offered the ordaining prayer; Rev. Thomas Curtis of Bangor gave the charge to the candidate; Rev. T. O. Lincoln, pastor of the Free Street Church, Portland, extended the hand of fellowship; Rev. Z. Bradford of Yarmouth delivered the address to the church; and the concluding prayer was offered by Rev. Alvan Felch of New Gloucester. Mr. Champlin entered upon his labors with great earnestness, and proved an efficient and successful pastor. But from the first his health was very precarious. His lungs were weak and susceptible to cold and irritation, and preaching greatly aggravated the difficulty. But he loved the work, and was happy in it.

In the second year of his pastorate, June 12, 1839, Mr. Champlin was married to Mary Ann Pierce of Providence, Rhode Island, President Wayland performing the ceremony.

In 1840, precious revival influences were enjoyed, and about eighty new members were added to the church by baptism. On the annual Fast Day, 1841, he preached a sermon on the "Death of President Harrison," which was published by request of the society. But pleasantly as he was situated, and much as he loved his work, the bronchial difficulty, that had troubled him from the beginning of his pastorate, increased, and there were times when he was unable to preach. At the annual commencement of Waterville College, August 11, 1841, he was elected professor of ancient languages in that institution. The conviction already had been frequently forced upon his mind that it would be impossible for him long to continue in the pastorate. Yet he could not endure the thought of engaging in any entirely secular calling. A professorship at Waterville would enable him to continue his labors for the higher interests of mankind; and in a letter dated August 23, 1841, he presented to the church his resignation as pastor. In this letter, after stating the reasons that had led him to request dismissal, he said, referring to the position offered to him at Waterville:—

As this office will enable me to avail myself of my early studies, and at the same time presents a field of usefulness perhaps fully as important as the ministry, while it will relieve me almost entirely of the most injurious part of my present employment, I feel myself bound to ask my dismissal as pastor of this church, in anticipation of accepting the appointment. I have not come to this conclusion without much serious and prayerful consideration, and I hope not without the approbation of my heavenly Father. It would give me pleasure to spend my days with you, did it appear to be duty, but I cannot make myself think it is. I have been as happy and as contented in my relation to this church as I well could be in connection with any church; and I am happy to have this opportunity

of expressing my sincere and heartfelt thanks for the Christian kindness and courtesy with which you have invariably treated me, as well as for the many favors and attentions which you have bestowed upon myself and family. Be assured that they will never be forgotten.

The resignation was accepted, and the church, in a letter dated August 30, 1841, responded to the pastor's communication. From this letter I take the following:—

When but a little more than three years since you became our pastor, we fondly hoped that a long time would elapse ere the relation between us would be dissolved. As weeks and months rolled away, each succeeding one witnessing a stronger and still stronger attachment between yourself and this church, the hope that you would be able in time to come to bring to us the lessons of experience, and the wisdom of age, was cherished by us with the reasonable confidence that it would be realized. But an all-seeing and an all-wise God had otherwise ordained. A little more than a year since, during the precious revival enjoyed under your ministrations, we had evident intimations that your work in the ministry must be short. The conviction was a painful one, but time has not contributed in the least to soften it. It is this conviction alone, dear brother, which reconciles us in any degree to the idea of giving you up. But as the hand of Providence seems plainly to have indicated the path of duty, we have, though with deep and painful regret, complied with your request to be dismissed from the pastoral charge of this church. Allow us before closing to express our highest sense of the value of your labor among us, of the truly evangelical character of your pulpit ministrations, of the ability and impartiality with which you have expounded to us the Word of God, and of the solicitude with which you have watched over our spiritual interests. We heartily thank you, dear brother, for your labors of love among us, for your patience and forbearance, and for all the means you have adopted to do us good. The Lord abundantly reward you and bless you in the new and effective sphere of usefulness which he has opened before you. It gives us great pleasure to know that you are to remain in our state. Allow us to hope that we shall see you occasionally, at least, in our pulpit, and that we shall never cease to have an interest in your prayers.

This letter was signed in behalf of the church by Thomas Hammond, Joseph Ricker and Joseph Hay.

The society adopted the following resolutions:—

Resolved, That the members of the First Baptist Society in Portland deeply regret that the relation hereto existing between them and their pastor, Rev. J. T. Champlin, is dissolved in consequence of the ill health of the latter, and that his usefulness is now about to cease among us.

Resolved, That the thanks of this society be presented to him for his uniform kindness toward us personally and his untiring efforts for our spiritual welfare.

Resolved, That we shall keep in lasting remembrance the earnest and eloquent appeals of our pastor to us for our everlasting good.

Resolved, That in taking leave we present to him our united and affectionate desires that his health may be restored, and a long and useful life be vouchsafed to him, and that when he shall be called to leave all earthly things that he shall be greeted with the joyful words, "Well done, good and faithful servant."

LEMUEL COBB,
EDWIN FERNALD,
CHARLES DAVIDSON, } Committee.

Dr. Champlin removed to Waterville, September 8, 1841, and entered upon what proved to be his life-work, succeeding in his professorship the late Phinehas Barnes. Waterville was then a remote country village on the stage line between Augusta and Bangor. For twenty years the college had struggled with poverty, and as yet only the beginnings of a collegiate institution had been made. It was still the day of small things. The endowment was small, the equipment was small, the salaries were small, and the classes were small. But the institution had a strong corps of instructors. Three of them, Dr. G. W. Keely, professor of mathematics and natural philosophy, Dr. J. R. Loomis, after-

ward for twenty years president of Lewisburg, now Bucknell University, professor of chemistry and natural history, and Dr. Champlin, professor of Greek and Latin, were graduates of Brown University. Loomis and Champlin, who were pupils of Dr. Wayland, had imbibed his spirit and adopted his methods; and this last was also true of Professor Keely, who was a tutor at Brown in the first year of Dr. Wayland's presidency. In 1843, Rev. David N. Sheldon succeeded Eliphaz Fay as president of the college. At the same time, Martin B. Anderson, a graduate of the college, and afterward president of Rochester University, was made professor of rhetoric. These all were men of intellectual strength, and by their ability and sound scholarship they gave to the college a reputation which it had not before secured.

Early in his connection with the college Professor Champlin felt the need of a better edition of "Demosthenes on the Crown" than the one by Negris, in use at that time. Gathering around him the best helps he could obtain, he devoted himself untiringly to his task, availing himself of the encouragement and criticism of his interested associates. The work was finished and published in 1843, and immediately came into use in many of our American colleges. A review of the work, by Professor Felton of Harvard College presumably, appeared in the "North American Review" for January, 1844 (pages 240-243). After indicating what is required in a good critical edition of this "most valuable and interesting among all the remains of Attic eloquence," the reviewer said: —

These conditions have been ably fulfilled by the present editor. The text he has presented is a great improvement upon that of Mr. Negris. It

is fairly printed, and on good paper; the only fault to be found with this part of the work is a number of typographical errors in that portion of the text which accidentally was deprived of the benefit of the editor's revision. A well written preface explains the editor's plan, and states the sources from which he has drawn his chief materials. This is followed by a copious analysis, embracing a general sketch of the plan of the oration, and then a careful enumeration of the topics, paragraph by paragraph, as they are successively handled by the orator. This analysis is carefully and accurately executed, and will be of material advantage to the student for understanding the orator's arrangement. The text is followed by a body of notes, containing ample explanations of legal terms and technical formulas, historical facts comprehended in the political life of the orator, and careful analyses of the difficult passages. The best authorities have been freely consulted, and the information they contain judiciously combined. Hermann's excellent "Manual of Political Antiquities," and Thirwall's learned and impartial "History of Greece," have been constantly used. We approve the plan of this edition, and think the execution of it faithful and able. The work is a valuable addition to the series of classical books published in the United States.

Professor Champlin's edition of the "Oration on the Crown" passed through many editions, and for more than thirty years was the text-book generally in use in American colleges in the study of this masterly oration.

Other classical works followed. In 1848, Professor Champlin published "Select Popular Orations of Demosthenes"; in 1849, a translation of Kühner's Latin Grammar, from the German; in 1850, an edition of the Oration of Æschines on the Crown; in 1852, a "Short and Comprehensive Greek Grammar." In 1855, in recognition of his scholarly worth, the University of Rochester conferred upon Professor Champlin the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity.

In 1857, on the resignation of President Pattison, he was

elected president of the college and professor of moral and intellectual philosophy. The difficulties of the position he clearly recognized. In his inaugural address, delivered Tuesday afternoon, August 10, 1858, he said:—

Knowing full well, as I do, the history and condition of the college, I do not regard the office as a sinecure. Following a succession of able and learned men, and entering upon my duties at an important crisis in the history of the institution, I see nothing but labor and responsibility before me; and in these, indeed, I find my chief incitement. Whatever may be the illusions of youth in this matter, one at length learns that labor is less irksome than leisure, and responsibility more inspiring than a state of easy, quiet security. A fair field for the exertion of one's powers, the opportunity of doing something for the higher interests of society, the hope of giving greater efficiency to an important instrumentality, the consciousness that a large circle of interested spectators are watching the workings of a new arrangement, are among the more powerful and wholesome incitements which can be addressed to the human mind.

Such motives seem to me to exist in all their power in the present case. I admit the responsibility of the position. I welcome the labor, and hope to be able to approve myself to the friends of the institution as a faithful servant, whether successful or not. Indeed, I see much to encourage in the case. With a highly eligible situation, with a respectable number of interesting and interested students, with an increasing band of alumni to advocate our interests wherever they go, and a large constituency of friends, who, I trust, will show themselves ready, when the call is made—as it must be soon—to supply the only great need of the institution, "material aid," I cannot but feel that there is no ground for discouragement. Certain it is that if Waterville College, in its present state of maturity, and with its acknowledged advantages of situation, etc., does not for the future make reasonable progress, it will be either from the want of proper management here, or for the want of proper co-operation and support among its friends. Let us hope that neither will be wanting, that the designs of Providence in planting the institution may not be frustrated.

In the spirit of these noble words, recognizing fully the obstacles to be overcome, Dr. Champlin entered vigorously

and intelligently upon his new task. Waterville College, in 1857, had three buildings, very much out of repair, and an invested fund of about twelve or fifteen thousand dollars. To increase this fund was a matter of present urgent necessity, and in 1859, Rev. Horace T. Love was employed by the college for this purpose. He succeeded in obtaining subscriptions to the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars, and then relinquished his agency. The work was soon taken up by President Champlin and other members of the faculty, but their self-denying efforts were not crowned with great success. National affairs, to the exclusion of other things, attracted the attention and demanded the energies of the people.

But in the third year of the civil war, when in Boston one day, Dr. Champlin learned from the late Jonah G. Warren, D.D., then corresponding secretary of the Missionary Union, that Gardner Colby of Newton, some of whose early years were spent in Winslow and Waterville, and whose mother Dr. Chaplin, the first president of the college, had befriended, was meditating generous purposes toward Waterville College. Dr. Champlin called on him at once, and the result was that Mr. Colby attended the commencement of the college in August that year. On commencement day Dr. Champlin received from Mr. Colby the following note:—

WATERVILLE, Aug. 10, 1864.

REV. J. T. CHAMPLIN, D.D.,

MY DEAR SIR:—I propose to give Waterville College the sum of fifty thousand dollars (\$50,000), the same to be paid without interest as follows, viz.:—

Twenty-five thousand dollars when your subscriptions shall amount to one hundred thousand dollars, independent of any from me.

Twenty-five thousand dollars when one hundred thousand is paid on your subscriptions, not including any from me ; and upon the condition that the president, and a majority of the faculty, shall be members in good standing of regular Baptist churches.

If either or any of these conditions are broken, the entire fifty thousand dollars shall revert to myself, or my heirs or assigns. I remain,

Yours very truly,

GARDNER COLBY.

The contents of this note were made known to the alumni and friends of the college at the commencement dinner. Rev. F. W. Bakeman, D.D., who was then a student in the college, and as one of the marshals of the day was present at the dinner in the old town hall, has given a graphic account of the scene when the announcement of this proposed gift was made : —

Dr. Champlin arose and stood a brief pause, as if to command the unreserved attention of the company. How pale he looked ! How strangely his voice seemed to shake as he spoke ! There were no tears in his eyes, but there was what makes tears in his utterance. As long as I live I shall recall the grand old man in that historic hour, which was to him the victor's crown, after years of hardest warfare. And now the announcement was given that the gentleman at his side, a short, plump little man, with a benevolent appearing face, who might have been taken for one of the Cheeryble brothers, had made the definite and formal proposition to give the college the sum of fifty thousand dollars as a permanent fund, on condition that the friends of the institution should add one hundred thousand. The announcement ran through that company like a kindling fire. Mr. Colby was known to few ; his intention was known to fewer still. The rumor had not got abroad. It was a genuine surprise. For a moment there was stillness, as in the hush before the breaking of the tempest — and then — there was a tempest — a wild demonstration of joy and glad surprise, such as I have never since witnessed. Hands, feet, voices, knives and forks rapping on the tables, all bore a part in the concert of applause. Men shook hands, and fairly hugged each other in their transports of joy.

Such unfeigned delight is seldom seen. The hall rang again and again to their cheers. It seemed as if they would never stop. The fountains of affection had been broken up, and their torrents could not be easily checked. Never from that day have I questioned the devotion of Colby's alumni. Fifty thousand dollars does not seem so great now as it did then. For Waterville, under the circumstances, that sum was a princely fortune. But there was more than this in consideration. Men saw that this donation meant one hundred and fifty thousand dollars of endowment. They had faith to believe that it would be raised. In this glad hour the long-needed inspiration had come, and all things were now possible. Men realized instinctively that on this auspicious day a new era had begun for our long-struggling institution. This hour marked an epoch. Meanwhile, through all this storm of applause, the Cheeryble brother, who was its beneficent cause, sat blushingly. To the clamorous calls of his name he made a brief response, no word of which can I recall. The facts of that day crowded out words. What Mr. Colby felt on that occasion no man can know. I have often thought that ten years of life would be a small price for the experience of so blissful an hour. Finally the doxology was sung, and the commencement of 1864 was over; the night-time in the history of Waterville College was ended, and morning had come to Colby University.

In raising the one hundred thousand dollars required in order to secure Mr. Colby's conditional gift, Dr. Champlin performed heroic service, as did some of his colleagues; and the money was at length obtained. Then, in 1866, at Dr. Champlin's suggestion, and entirely without any understanding with Mr. Colby, the trustees voted to apply to the legislature of the state for an act changing the name of the college to Colby University; and the act was passed January 23, 1867.

The college now entered upon an era of prosperity. Added funds came into its treasury for building purposes. Memorial Hall, costing about forty thousand dollars, was

erected; Coburn Hall, costing more than twenty-five thousand dollars, followed; then the old chapel was remodeled at an expense of six thousand dollars, and the North College at an expense of eight thousand five hundred dollars. And yet in 1872, when these improvements had been made and paid for, the invested funds of the college had increased to two hundred thousand dollars. Of the money thus expended or invested, Dr. Champlin obtained (directly or indirectly) and collected nearly two hundred thousand dollars; and as chairman of the prudential committee he had the entire oversight of the above-named improvements, and the chief direction of the investment of the college funds.

During this period of upbuilding and endowing the college, Dr. Champlin prosecuted his studies with old-time vigor. When he became president of the college he devoted himself to the duties of his professorship of moral and intellectual philosophy with the same interest with which he had hitherto devoted himself to the Latin and Greek classics. He soon published an edition of "Butler's Analogy and Ethical Discourses." This was followed, in 1860, by "A Text Book on Intellectual Philosophy"; in 1861, by his "First Principles of Ethics"; and in 1868, by his "Lessons on Political Economy." These works passed through successive editions, and were used as text-books in other colleges. But, as the late Mr. H. W. Richardson, editor of the Portland Daily Advertiser, and a pupil of Dr. Champlin, said:—

The service which Dr. Champlin rendered to the college and to his generation is not measured or even indicated by a list of his published works. He was not merely, or even primarily, a literary man. He was pre-eminently a man of affairs—a man who would naturally have become a great

merchant or a successful politician. His tendencies were all practical. He edited Greek and Latin text-books because in the place where he found himself that was the thing to do. When he left the professorship of ancient languages he turned to other studies without regret, and with the same industry and sound appreciation of the requirements of his new position.

August 2, 1870, in connection with the annual commencement, President Champlin delivered an historical discourse, it being the fiftieth anniversary of the college. Having reviewed the history of the college, he closed with these words:—

Standing now, as we do, at the middle point of the first century of the existence of the institution, whether we look backward or forward, have we not reason to thank God and take courage? The college has been useful; the university, I have no doubt, is destined to a still higher usefulness. The foundations are already laid, and well laid, and the superstructure, I am confident, will gradually rise in fitting beauty and proportions. It will have a history to be recounted, I have no doubt, at the close of another half-century. And as the centuries roll on, chapter after chapter will have to be added to this history, till some future generation, looking back over its whole course, and estimating the influence which has gone forth from it to bless the world, will come to realize, if we do not now, how great a boon to a community is a Christian institution of learning, established and sustained and nurtured up to a high purpose by the prayers, the labors and the contributions of the wise and good.

Dr. Champlin now felt that his work, as president of the college, was done, and at the commencement in July, 1872, he asked to be relieved of the burden he had carried so long. By request of the trustees he remained at his post a year longer. When he then retired from the service of the college, Colby University had an invested fund of two hundred and fourteen thousand dollars, and no debts. He had

been connected with the college thirty-two years, one-half of the time as professor and one-half of the time as president.

The trustees of the university, in accepting Dr. Champlin's resignation, adopted the following resolution:—

Resolved, That in accepting his resignation, the Board of Trustees would express their gratitude to Dr. Champlin for the long-continued, diligent and laborious services which he has rendered as an instructor, and for the singular devotedness to the general interests and welfare of the university which he has uniformly manifested; and that, in retiring from the office of the presidency, he will bear with him the friendship and good wishes of this Board.

In 1860, Brown University conferred upon Dr. Champlin the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity, and in 1872, when he resigned the presidency, Colby University conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

It was Dr. Champlin's purpose upon his retirement from the college, to spend his remaining years in Waterville; but three of his children were living in Portland, and family ties soon drew him thither. He removed to Portland in April, 1874, and here, among his books, and surrounded by those whom he loved, he passed the closing years of a useful and busy life. In 1875, he was made a trustee of Colby University. Continuing his literary labors, he prepared a volume of "Bible Selections for Family Reading." Then, returning to his classical studies, he prepared a volume of "Selections from Tacitus," which he published in 1876. In 1880, he published a work on the Constitution of the United States.

Of his minor publications the following are worthy of mention:—In 1846, Dr. Champlin preached a sermon before the Maine Baptist Convention at Brunswick, entitled "Apollos the Preacher," which was published by the con-

vention. He published also the following review articles:—"Popular Lecturing," *Christian Review*, April, 1850; "Grote's History of Greece," *Christian Review*, October, 1851; "Bishop Butler," *Christian Review*, July, 1854; "Hume's Philosophy," *Christian Review*, April, 1855; "Moral Philosophy," *Christian Review*, April, 1860; "Protection and Free Trade," *Baptist Quarterly*, October, 1873; and "Psychology," *Baptist Quarterly*, April, 1874. June 24, 1856, he delivered an address before the Society of Missionary Inquiry of Newton Theological Institution, on "Religion and Philanthropy." March 14, 1878, he read a paper before the Maine Historical Society, entitled "Educational Institutions in Maine while a District of Massachusetts," which is included in volume VIII of the society's collections. He also frequently accepted invitations to deliver addresses before educational societies, teachers' conventions, lyceums, etc.

In 1872, at the annual meeting of the Maine Baptist Education Society at Bath, it was voted, on motion of Dr. Champlin, "That it is expedient that an effort be made to endow Waterville Classical Institute, by starting a subscription, to raise for it a fund of fifty thousand dollars." At the meeting of the same society in 1873, a committee was appointed to confer with the trustees of Colby University in reference to this matter. One of the results of that conference was the passage of resolutions by the Board of Trustees, recommending "That an effort be made to raise one hundred thousand dollars at the earliest day practicable, for the endowment of three preparatory schools, one of which shall be located at Waterville, one at some place in the east-

ern section of the state, and one in the western section." At the meeting of the Education Society in 1874, it was announced that ex-Governor Coburn had offered to give fifty thousand dollars for the endowment of Waterville Classical Institute, provided fifty thousand dollars additional should be raised for the endowment of the other proposed schools. Rev. A. R. Crane undertook the work of raising this fifty thousand dollars, and the money, when secured, was committed to the trustees of Colby University for the benefit of Hebron Academy and Houlton Academy (now Ricker Classical Institute), as was Governor Coburn's gift for the benefit of Waterville Classical Institute (now Coburn Classical Institute, in memory of Hon. Stephen Coburn and his son, Charles M. Coburn). Dr. Champlin took a very deep interest in the endowment of these preparatory schools, and in 1878, when the subscription had been completed, he prepared a plan for organizing the department of academies, which was adopted by the trustees of Colby University.

One of his last efforts for the good of others was in behalf of the church in Portland, of which he was once pastor. In the great fire in that city, in 1866, the First Baptist Church lost its house of worship. More than ninety families connected with the church were made homeless by the destructive flames. In rebuilding, a debt was incurred larger than was anticipated. The burden thus assumed was heroically borne, but its weight at length was severely felt. Dr. Champlin, on returning to Portland, had united with the Free Street Church, which was nearer his residence; but he had lost none of his affection for the old church to which he had ministered at the beginning of his public career, and

he desired to see at least a part of this burden of debt removed. Accordingly, in 1880, he invited some of the members of the church to a conference, at which he said he thought ten thousand dollars could be raised if an effort should be made, and offered to give one thousand himself. At the last communion season which he was able to attend at the Free Street Church, he referred to the oppressive debt resting upon the First Church, and urged his associates to help the mother church in this time of need. The Free Street Church generously responded. The brethren and friends at the First Church, as always, responded to this new call heartily and with much self-sacrifice. In other places friends of the church nobly aided, and in a short time nearly ten thousand, seven hundred dollars were obtained; the remaining debt, about nine thousand dollars, was refunded at a lower rate of interest, and the First Church entered upon a new stage in its history, encouraged and strengthened.

Only one shadow rested upon Dr. Champlin during these closing years of his life. November 24, 1875, his only daughter, Mrs. Caroline C. Burrage, dearly beloved, was suddenly and unexpectedly taken from the home circle. Submissively he bowed his head; and though his words were few, yet all could see that for him the rest of the way in life was through the valley of the shadow of death.

He was last in Waterville at the commencement in 1879. The privilege of meeting with his old associates and pupils he greatly enjoyed. They received him with enthusiasm, and he rejoiced with them in the evidences of the growing influence and prosperity of the college.

In May, 1880, he attended the national Baptist anniversaries at Saratoga, but the extreme heat of anniversary week affected him, and he hastened back to Portland. "I am confident that this is paralysis," he said, as feebly he came up the steps of his home in the early morning of his arrival. He remained in his study during the day, and at night, on retiring, he ascended the staircase unaided. When he awoke the next morning his right side was paralyzed.

At the commencement at Colby University in July following, at the annual meeting of the alumni, the class of 1855 presented the following preamble and resolution, which were adopted by a rising vote: —

Whereas, We learn that, in the Providence of God, Rev. Dr. Champlin, for many years a professor in Waterville College, and later the esteemed and venerated president of the university, has been suddenly stricken by disease, and is now lying in a comparatively helpless condition of bodily infirmity,

Resolved, That we hereby express our heartfelt sorrow in view of this affliction laid upon one whom we regard with feelings of profound respect and sincere affection. As those who have been immeasurably indebted to him for instruction and counsel in former years, and who have learned something of the geniality of his nature by the intercourse of friendship and of social life, we desire to tender to him our earnest sympathy, accompanied by a fervent prayer that God would bless the means employed for his restoration, and so extend his useful life that he may continue to be a benefactor to this institution which he has so tenderly cherished, and for which he has so zealously labored.

Dr. Champlin slowly improved during the summer months, and several times he rode out a short distance; but the effort was too great, and he did not leave the house again during his illness. His mind remained unclouded until about a month before his death. He often expressed a fear that in

the progress of his disease reason would at length fail him, and that he would then become a burden to his family. While he was thus laid aside, Dr. Shailer, pastor of the First Church, with whom he had long been associated in different relations, suddenly died; and when the tidings were borne to his sick chamber, he said he counted Dr. Shailer happy in that so suddenly and so peacefully he had been transferred to the better land. Yet no murmur escaped his lips during those long and weary months. Quietly, trustfully, he awaited the end. Talking to himself on his bed one day, he was asked what he was talking about. He replied, "Political science; the importance of Christianity to the world; and Tacitus—how I should like to teach it again! My Tacitus is the best book I have written, I think." During the last month of his life, after his mind became clouded, it was noticeable that it remained clear in reference to matters pertaining to the college, and most pathetic was his appeal one day, when in his delirium, imagining himself away from home, he asked to be taken back to Waterville, where he had labored so long and so well. He did not wish to survive the loss of reason, and in this his desire was mercifully granted. On Tuesday night, March 14, 1882, he did not rest as well as usual. He said he was tired, and as the night wore away he asked if it was almost morning. About five o'clock Wednesday, March 15, the nurse noticed that his breathing was short and quick. His wife was at once summoned, but when she reached the bedside she found that he had ceased to breathe; so suddenly and so easily, after long months of suffering and weariness, he had entered into the rest that remaineth to the people of God.

Beside Mrs. Champlin, three children survived him:—James P. Champlin, Augustus Champlin, and Frank A. Champlin, all of Portland.

The funeral services occurred at the Free Street Church, on Saturday afternoon, March 18. It was Dr. Champlin's wish that his successor in the presidency at Waterville, Rev. Henry E. Robins, D.D., should be present, and participate in the services, but his health did not permit, and reluctantly he was compelled to remain at home. "I have a deep appreciation of Dr. Champlin's services to the college," he wrote. "He rendered possible whatever success I have been able to achieve." Nearly all of the alumni and the trustees of the university residing in Portland and vicinity were present. Hon. Percival Bonney, Prof. Edward W. Hall of Colby University, Hanson M. Hart, Esq., and Hon. Neal Dow, were the pall bearers. The casket, in front of the pulpit, was surrounded with beautiful floral emblems, including a broken column, cross and crown, sickle and sheaf. A vase of flowers on a stand at the foot of the casket was from the resident alumni of the university.

At the opening of the service the choir sang "Rest in the Lord." Rev. T. D. Anderson, jr., pastor of the First Baptist Church, read selections from the Scriptures. Addresses were then made by Rev. James McWhinnie, Professor Moses Lyford of Colby University, and General J. L. Chamberlain, President of Bowdoin College.

REV. J. MCWHINNIE'S ADDRESS.

As his pastor, it falls to me first, in this last service, to speak of our brother, James Tift Champlin, who for the past eight years has been a faithful member of the Free Street Baptist Church.

Born in the same state, I had often heard of him as a son of Connecticut, honoring his native commonwealth as the able and successful president of Waterville College. I had met the graduates of the college in the seminary and elsewhere, and from them had become interested in his character before I had seen him, and when it was not in all my dreams that I should ever become his pastor. When I came to Portland at the call of the church, it was with considerable apprehension I learned that Dr. Champlin was a member of it, and that if I accepted the call I must assume the position of his religious shepherd and teacher. But, to my relief, the Doctor was one of the first to greet me and to offer me his help and sympathy. Most kindly, generously, he fulfilled the pledge he freely offered. The seven years of this relation, in many respects intimate and confidential, have seen not a single word or deed on his part to mar their harmony. He has sometimes advised or corrected me, but not so often as I wished; for when he came to me it was always so kindly as to charm me, almost so deferentially as to make me wonder. He was a generous hearer, overlooking mistakes, not lavish in words of praise, but always listening for and rejoicing in the truths of the Gospel.

On coming to Portland in 1874, Dr. Champlin was returning to the scene of his first labors and successes in the state. In 1838, while still a young man, he became pastor of the First Baptist Church, which position he retained for more than three years. For himself and the church these were happy years. He was permitted the joy of welcoming to the church nearly one hundred members, most of them upon profession of their faith in Christ. Many of these remain until this day. Many others preceded him to the church triumphant. With these he now knows the meaning of Paul's jubilant words, "What is our hope, or joy, or crown of rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence of our Lord Jesus Christ at his coming?" In consequence of an affection of the throat, aggravated by preaching, he was compelled to resign the pastorate August 23, 1841, when he removed to Waterville. He left the church a strong and united body, with nearly three hundred members, well fitted for the influential position it has since maintained.

Returning to the scene of these early labors with a national reputation as a wise and successful college president, honored by scholars throughout the land, many of whom were his pupils, esteemed by his brethren in the

ministry and in all the churches, he yet found no difficulty in settling down into the quiet and comparative obscurity of his Portland life. I venture to say nothing has more won the respect of those who knew him in these high places of usefulness than the graceful and childlike humility of his later years. Not a vestige of bitterness marked his speech or conduct. The successful pastor, the college president, the denominational leader and counselor, became at once the faithful, helpful layman, always in his place in church, regular in the prayer-meeting as his health permitted, often leading our devotions, and testifying in the simplest manner to the truth and power of the Gospel. After his health forbade his attendance at the meetings of the church, his interest in them remained unabated; and when any new case of inquiry or conversion was reported, it was to him always a cause of thanksgiving.

Two years ago next month Dr. Champlin felt impressed that he must carry out a purpose which he had long cherished. The First Baptist Church, his former flock, was heavily burdened with debt, an inheritance of the great fire, which had not only destroyed their house of worship, but impoverished many of their members. This debt, in spite of every exertion and sacrifice, had become well-nigh fatal to the prosperity of the church. Our brother resolved to help them and to summon others to their aid. He took into his counsels a generous brother of this church, and together they pledged two thousand dollars. With this amount he came before his brethren at the next communion, and urged the need of the mother church, and the duty of aiding them in one more strong effort to raise ten thousand dollars of their debt. The effort was successful, and the church was lifted from its state of discouragement to one of assured confidence for the future.

This was the last of our brother's earthly work. It was his last communion with the church. In a few weeks, while at Saratoga attending the national anniversaries of the denomination, he was stricken with incipient paralysis. Returning home, he became more and more, but almost imperceptibly, a victim of the disease. During the greater part of the time since his mind has retained its clearness and strength, and his interest in the college, the church and affairs has been undiminished. He has read much of general literature, but his constant companion was his New Testament, which he loved most of all, and of which it was his delight to

speak. Among his latest works was a volume of "Scriptural Selections for Family Worship," accompanied with explanatory and practical comments. Thus his life-work began and ended with the exposition of the Word of God, the deep, pure well of divine wisdom and truth.

I need not dwell upon his character and private life; they were such as became a teacher of learning, a preacher of righteousness, a disciple of Christ. Imperfect he was indeed. No man was more conscious of his imperfections or more sincerely mourned over his faults; but his life and character present no blot or stain to be covered up or apologized for. If he was just with others he was severe with himself; and those who knew him best soon discovered the kindness of heart beneath his stern demeanor. It is the testimony of many who at first feared him, that before they parted with him they loved him as a father. And none will cherish his memory more dearly than the graduates of the college who have seen him and known him in these last years of his life.

It was plain to us all that our friend entered into the valley of the shadow so long ago as November, 1875, when the dear daughter, who had been such a comfort and stay, was translated from his home. It was then he said to me in the deepest anguish, "The joy of our heart is ceased." From that time his step was feebler and his eye more dim. He still retained his habits of study and composition; but it was daily plainer to his friends that the silver cord was loosed and the pitcher breaking at the fountain. The later stroke of disease was only a lower descent into the valley, where at last he has quietly laid aside his labors and entered into rest. He now sees the King in his beauty, and seeing him as he is, is transformed into the same image from glory to glory.

When the Lord told his disciples that he must leave them, he said, "None of you asketh me, whither goest thou? But because I have said these things sorrow hath filled your hearts." To those who remain in sorrow to-day I commend the thought of the happiness of the husband and father now released from earth's care and pain, already entered upon the life of pure and holy service, of far higher attainment in knowledge, of the perfection of spiritual beauty, of blessed reunion with the loved ones gone before. I commend the hope of a joyful resurrection, the consummation of the Christian's faith. Thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

PROFESSOR LYFORD'S ADDRESS.

Entering college in 1839, I had completed about one-half of my course when Dr. Champlin came to Waterville as a professor. I knew him as my teacher for two years. What I knew of him is and has been known by all who have been under his instruction. I need not dwell upon it; it has already been alluded to in the remarks that have been made. Sometimes college students, on their first approach to Dr. Champlin, felt that he was stern, and not easily approached; but I can bear witness to what has already been said, and to what can be testified to by so many others, that the nearer we got to him the more warmth we found; and very few students ever went through the college and graduated who did not leave it without profoundly reverencing him and loving him.

After an absence of thirteen years, from 1843 to 1856, I became associated with him as a member of the faculty. For one year following he occupied his place as professor, and I stood on the same level with him. For sixteen years after that I looked up to him as the honored head of the institution. The more I saw of him the better I knew him, and the more I loved and respected him.

Associated together as a half-a-dozen of us were for that length of time, we had opportunities for knowing him better than if we had been associated in larger numbers. We were brought very closely together during those sixteen years, and some who are here may be aware that such relations are not always the most pleasant. There have been cases where it was otherwise. But I am very much gratified to be able to stand here and have nothing to conceal, and nothing whatever to reserve. Every remembrance of that sixteen years is pleasant.

Dr. Champlin was a man you could trust. That is saying more than at first might seem. Those of this audience who have lived the longest know best what it means. We never suspected him of anything he did not put forth. He was an honest man, a noble-hearted man, a generous-souled man in every respect, at all times and under all circumstances. I know that is saying much, but it is deserved.

We knew him at Waterville not only as a member of the college faculty, not only as president of the college, but in the social meetings. We knew him everywhere where good could be done by a man occupying his position. He was not an impulsive man, yet he did not wait for people to urge

him forward. His inquiry seemed to be first of all, "What can I do, what ought I to do?" and when satisfied of that he did it in the best way he could. I do not think he could ever have said, as do some persons, after having performed a duty which devolved upon him, no matter how suddenly, that he had disgraced himself by not doing it better. He always did the best he could, and left the result to Him to whom he owed the duty. He was a man in all respects, everywhere, and under all circumstances. He always seemed to think more of soul than of semblance, more of man than manner. I think it may safely be said that the longer we cherish his memory, in whatever capacity we have known him, in whatever relations we have sustained to him, the greener it will grow.

PRESIDENT CHAMBERLAIN'S ADDRESS.

A man has passed away from us whose work abides and will abide. We come here to-day to bid adieu to this venerated form, and to renew our memories of him, of his work, of his life and of his love. We meet to make him even more to us hereafter than before. I come also to stand here with you, and mingle my tributes with yours. To the man who loved his country, his state, and the community in which he lived, and who labored for them with his best, I offer the salutations, may I say, of a fellow-citizen. To the scholar, to the strong and strenuous man in the cause of education, to the maker of books, to the instructor of youth, the college which I represent offers a sincere and affectionate tribute.

I had met our dear friend perhaps but little, considering that in his broad, generous heart he was so willing to consider me so much a friend; but the occasions on which we had met, and the relations we sustained to each other on those several occasions, revealed us to each other, perhaps, in a manner that drew us together in a peculiar way. I first knew him when he was laboring so zealously to build up his college, our college, the college of the state, the college of the country, and the college of Christianity. I sympathized with him in that, and I remember he thought it worth his while to consult me as to changing the name of that venerable institution. I was not a graduate, but as a citizen of the state I hesitated about having the old familiar name of the college changed; and then I saw, in the reasons he gave me, the wide and profound views he took of the influences and means by which institutions of learning must be built up.

That was the beginning of our acquaintance, which rapidly grew to friendship. I was made a welcome guest in his home more than once, and he has honored my home with his presence. It came to be almost a custom with him to visit our college annually, and I often saw him at the meetings of the Historical Society. Lately we had some conversations together upon the preparation of his work on Constitutional Law, and then I had occasion to see and appreciate the broad and loyal patriotism of the man, and the soundness and clearness of his views as to those great questions which belong to the foundation of our institutions and our government.

Thus I have seen our dear friend in different relations, and from each successive step of approach to each other I have honored him, and raised him higher and higher in my thoughts, and taken him nearer to my heart.

I wish I were able to say the things which still might be said with truth, things other than those which have been brought before us this afternoon. But I must, dear friends, be allowed to speak of the remarkable industry and energy of our friend. I have had occasion to know something of the work he was doing for his college, but how he could at the same time he was doing so much to found the institution financially, arrange to put forth so many books, evincing thorough scholarship and hard work, I cannot understand. I regard it as an example, one indeed I had almost said which rather discourages than encourages us, for how can we follow, how can we reach to those heights which he seemed so easily to achieve? The thought of it almost rebukes me, and makes me feel that I have done little in comparison.

The work he did for the college abides in more ways than one. It has been said that the institution is a monument to him. Those who know its history know how true that is. But beyond books, and beyond college walls of brick and stone, and beyond even the words of instruction in the class-room, there is a mighty power which the true educator wields, and it is that of influence. I think in a college, for example, it is more the influence of the man than the books he may have written, or the words of instruction he may have uttered, which works on the minds and character of his pupils. The strongest feature in education, it seems to me, is influence. Now, our friend's true, strong, generous and noble character I am very sure must have impressed those who met him from time to time, as it impressed me. I owe him a debt of that kind. The influence of his char-

acter, of the man he was, fell into my spirit, I know, like good seed. When I know how many there must be in the community and all over the world in whom lives to-day the effect of the influence of our friend's character, I say his work abides in a different sense from the monument of brick and stone which he has left behind. He lives, dear friends, in our hearts, and his spirit abides with us. How then can we wholly bid him farewell? We do not. It is almost, as I said at the beginning, like a greeting, like a salutation we make to that image of him which exists in all of us who knew him, an image which we must respect and love and venerate.

God help us worthily to follow those influences, worthily to cherish and nurture those good seeds of sound doctrine, of noble character, of true Christianity, which he has cast abroad.

I must not detain you longer; I know how weak and unworthy of him my poor words seem to you; but I lay here the chaplet of dearest memories and affections. These flowers, emblems of beauty and immortality, are not more sweet than the thoughts and loving memories which are linked with him.

At the close of the addresses the choir sang "Only Wait," and Rev. Asa Dalton of St. Stephen's Church offered a fervent prayer. After the benediction by Rev. James McWhinnie, the alumni and friends took a farewell look at the deceased, and the burial at Evergreen Cemetery followed.

Two tributes, from men long and intimately associated with Dr. Champlin in educational and religious work in Maine, are added. The first is from a letter written by Rev. S. K. Smith, D.D., the senior professor in Colby University, and dated March 16, 1882:—

We shall all feel deeply the death of Dr. Champlin. He came to Waterville as professor when I entered Colby as student in 1841. I knew and honored him as my teacher, and was associated with him also as an instructor for twenty-five years, and during all this period I saw in Dr. Champlin one character, and that was a character of unswerving, invinc-

ible integrity. He was true to his convictions and true to every relation of his life. He no doubt made mistakes, but I believe he was entirely incapable of doing a conscious wrong to a fellow-being. During his presidency here what particularly struck those who were connected with him was the complete subordination and hiding of his own personal interests beneath the broader interests of the College. During the fifteen years of that arduous and overburdened presidency I never heard a teacher under him lisp the suspicion that one official act of his was prompted by a selfish or dishonorable motive. No work was too high for him, no work too low that was lawful and necessary for the accomplishment of the noble ends he sought. Nor was any task too severe or sacrifice too great. I saw him under every variety of trial, perplexity, annoyance, and disaster, and yet I never heard him utter one word of complaint. If he was wronged, if he had grievances, no associate of his was ever asked to share these burdens with him. There was a noble heroism in that character. And now I ask myself, will the Baptists of Maine understand the greatness of their loss? To those who knew him as we did here the sense of it will grow as the years roll on, and the hollowness of this world of shams is more and more exposed.

The following is a letter from Rev. J. Ricker, D.D., dated Augusta, March 16, 1882:—

The announcement of Dr. Champlin's death touches me very deeply. Though a few years my senior, I have known him intimately for the last forty years and more. When I went to Portland in 1839 to take editorial charge of the Advocate, he was pastor of the First Baptist Church, and as such welcomed me to membership in that body, and signed my license to preach the Gospel. In my first pulpit endeavors his sympathy and counsels were invaluable to me. My memory of them, now that he has passed beyond the veil, is of a very vivid and tender character. He probably never realized to the full extent how much he helped me in those years of self-distrust and misgiving. It is a great debt that I owe him.

I could not but be well acquainted with his subsequent career at Waterville, both as professor and president. It is a memorable service that he rendered to that college. It is reasonably certain that no other man would have rendered a like service, and equally certain, I think, that scarcely

another man, under the same circumstances, could have rendered it. He did just the right work in just the right way and at just the right time. On its earthward side it was a thankless task. From the higher standpoint of the moral and the spiritual it was a work to inspire and nerve the whole being to action. To an unreflecting observer it seemed plodding; but to a soul gifted with even a faint pre-vision of the fruitage sure to follow, it was instinct with life and beauty and lofty inspiration. Dr. Champlin needs no monument at the hands of others. He has reared his own, and it is a monument that speaks with rare and touching eloquence to those of us who survive him. In enduring brick and stone it dots the campus of Colby University; but though that brick and stone may mutely tell to coming ages something of what he did, they can never tell it all. Indeed, they can give but a faint hint of his lifework. Who shall say that, but for his quiet, persistent, heroic endeavors to place Waterville College upon a secure financial basis, Gardner Colby would ever have seen the grand possibilities involved, and have dowered her with a name coupled with the magnificent gift of two hundred thousand dollars? If what a man moves others to do, no less than what he does himself, belongs to the fruitage of his life, then to President Champlin, I think, more than to any other human agent, belongs the credit of securing to Colby University the hundreds of thousands that now enrich its treasury and augment its usefulness. But it is not alone, or perhaps chiefly, to the buildings and endowment that we should have regard in estimating the aggregate results of such a life. The profound thinking, the critical sholarship, the patient study, the wise teaching, the wholesome counsels, the scrupulous fidelity in all little things, are to be taken into the account as well. Indeed, these last constitute the "upper half" of the character of this distinguished man. True, he could make no special boast of brilliancy; but that is only the thing of a day. He neither was, nor affected to be, a genius; but he was something far better. With an unusually robust intellect, an honest heart and a fixed purpose, he pushed his investigations into every field of inquiry pertaining to the several branches of learning he was called to teach. With unflagging industry he toiled, with pre-eminent fidelity he sought to discharge the great trusts committed to his keeping, and hence was faithful in little and also in much. His life has been a distinguished benediction, whether considered in its relation to the church or state, to

learning or to religion. Many and many are the persons who will feel an impulse to drop a tear of love and gratitude upon the grave of James Tift Champlin.

The following is an extract from a letter written by Rev. G. D. B. Pepper, D.D., who succeeded Dr. Robins in the presidency at Waterville. The letter is dated Chester, Pennsylvania, March 17, 1882:—

I have just heard that Dr. Champlin has gone on to his home. I have much reason to remember him with grateful respect. His sound, practical wisdom, coupled with great kindness and patient forbearance, was of incalculable benefit to me during my ministry at Waterville, and has assumed new value in my estimation year by year as I have looked back to those days. I have learned that such characters as his are rare. I rejoice that he was spared to a full age for the completion of a noble lifework.

In a letter, Rev. A. Bunker of Toungoo, Burma, records the following reminiscence:—

I believe that all students who went to Colby to do solid work found a friend in Dr. Champlin, and, as the years roll round, my admiration for his character increases. Dr. Champlin had a very tender heart under a stern exterior. This I discovered while yet in college. I remember on one occasion going to him to get an extension of time on "term bills." I was very poor, struggling through college, with no help save my own hands, and my "term bills" caught up with my resources and passed them. On presenting my case to the good Doctor in his private room, I was almost annihilated when he exclaimed, in his abrupt manner, "The laws of the college must be obeyed; the laws of the college must be obeyed"; but when I turned rather hopelessly toward the door, the good man stepped up to me, put his hand tenderly on my shoulder, and said, "Young man, don't be discouraged; help will come if you deserve it." I never heard anything more about the three "term bills" in arrears till the close of my course, when I paid them. If the laws of the college were obeyed, the good Doctor stepped in between them and me somehow. Some time after this, while I was walking in front of the buildings, putting the finish on a

morning lesson, I saw him coming toward me. I began to wonder what I had done to require the attention of the Doctor to me personally. He approached me, and speaking pleasantly, said, "What are you going to be — a minister? Deacon Greenough of Portland has given a scholarship, which is assigned to you, and I suppose he would like to know what you are going to do." This was the way he announced that the help would come for the rest of my course. Dr. Champlin stamped himself upon his pupils, and among the many whose instruction I have had the honor to enjoy, Dr. Champlin holds a large place.

On Tuesday, June 27, 1882, Rev. A. K. P. Small, D.D., then pastor of the First Baptist Church, Fall River, Massachusetts, delivered in the chapel at Waterville an address before the alumni, commemorative of the services of ex-President Champlin. In this address he said:—

Coming up to our annual literary festival this year, we look in vain for the honored form of one who moved regularly through these walks during more than thirty years, becoming so identified with what is most substantial here as to seem an essential part of this classic retreat. We look in vain for him? That is hardly true. How much of himself, of his best life, of his far-reaching wisdom — more than could be seen in a single human form — is here before you! These halls, consecrated to devotion, to sacred memories and to erudition, this grateful shade, these scholastic environments, all, all bear, and will continue to bear, what permanent impress of himself!

The pen of a competent and appreciative writer has already secured for history suitable record of his deeds. The president of another college has beautifully uttered the enviable tribute of contemporary educators. Pastor, associates, friends, have spoken of what he was, as pillar in the church, citizen, husband, father, friend. The sacred requiem has been chanted over the silent form from which, nearly four months ago, the immortal spirit fled. His name, his honor, are secure beyond the necessity of any words that can now be uttered. Yet you, sons and daughters of this institution, could not allow such violence to your own sense of gratitude and obligation as to pass through these anniversary days without

claiming a few moments, not for empty pageantry or formal eulogy, or the repetition of funeral rites, but for the privilege of offering a simple, unobtrusive garland at this favorite shrine of his professional and executive honors.

No better utterance in your behalf can now be attempted than imperfect translation into words of the prominent lesson which his life so permanently fastened upon this very place, viz.: that the noblest monument for one's self is what he builds for those who follow him; putting himself into what is better than even the nearest perfect effigy of bronze or marble — into the educated lives of those who shall better perpetuate his memory.

What evidences are here that President Champlin spent himself in building for others, yet spent himself in exactly the best way to perpetuate himself — bequeathing appointments of a literary home, in the perpetual influence of which he shall live in the successive generations of uplifted, cultured lives. We refer not to these granite edifices alone, but to his accompanying and more special intellectual work. Those who have never written nor edited a single volume that becomes a permanent educating power have no conception of the amount and varied elements of best life that must be given to it. But with the wearing responsibilities of the government of a college, and the peculiar financial burdens of the chairman of the prudential committee, through a career of most important building enterprise, all the while constantly filling the chair of instruction in the department of intellectual and moral philosophy, and at the same time so regularly and accurately carrying through the press standard classical and metaphysical works, like Greek grammars; editions of *Æschines*, Demosthenes, Butler; original text-books upon intellectual philosophy, ethics and political economy — such achievements of laborious scholarship President Chamberlain was pleased to call a mystery. To those who know how much of almost superhuman physical and mental life that requires, it is the mystery next to miracle.

And now, garnered among the treasures most secure, for the archives of the university and its tributary academies, for the honor of this town, for

the church, and the interests of sound learning, is the untarnished character and the continual influence of President James Tiift Champlin.

Like words of glowing eulogy were spoken in private as well as in public. They came as a conviction begotten in college days, and strengthened amid the struggles of later life in which Dr. Champlin's teachings and conduct proved suggestive and helpful. They may all be summed up in the glad welcome of the Master, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant!"

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

AS PRESIDENT OF WATERVILLE COLLEGE

DELIVERED TUESDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 10, 1858

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Gentlemen of the Trustees and Friends of the Institution:—

IT has seemed to me proper, on assuming the duties of the presidency of the college, that I should address to the assembled guardians and patrons of the institution a few remarks, indicating my views of the office and the character of the public education which it may be expected will be here imparted. I need not say that, knowing full well, as I do, the history and condition of the college, I do not regard the office as a sinecure. Following a succession of able and learned men, and entering upon my duties at an important crisis in the history of the institution, I see nothing but labor and responsibility before me—and in these, indeed, I find my chief incitement. Whatever may be the illusions of youth in this matter, one at length learns that labor is less irksome than leisure, and responsibility more inspiring than a state of easy, quiet security. A fair field for the exertion of one's powers, the opportunity of doing something for the higher interests of society, the hope of giving greater efficiency to an important instrumentality, the consciousness that a large circle of interested spectators are watching the workings of a new arrangement, are among the most powerful and wholesome incitements which can be addressed to the human mind.

Such motives seem to me to exist in all their power in the present case. I admit the responsibility of the position. I welcome the labor, and hope to be able to approve myself to the friends of the institution as a faithful servant, whether successful or not. Indeed, I see much to encourage in the case. With a highly eligible situation, with a respectable number of interesting and interested students, with an increasing band of alumni to advocate our interests wherever they go, and a large constituency of friends, who, I trust, will show themselves ready, when the call is made—as it must be soon—to supply the only great need of the institution, “material aid,” I cannot but feel that there is no ground for discouragement. Certain it is that, if Waterville College, in its present state of maturity, and with its acknowledged advantages of situation, etc., does not for the future make reasonable progress, it will be either for the want of proper management here, or for the want of proper co-operation and support among its friends. Let us hope that neither will be wanting, that the designs of Providence in planting the institution may not be frustrated. And that you may see what ground there is to hope that the failure will not be here, I propose briefly to sketch the character of the education which we shall aim to impart to those committed to our care.

College education has received various designations, as the higher education, a scholastic education, an education in the arts and sciences, etc.; but none of its designations seem to me so appropriate as that of liberal education. This, to my mind, best expresses the character of the education which ought to be imparted in a college. It is one of those

fortunate designations, which, hitting upon the true nature of the thing intended, is equally applicable to it at all times, and under all degrees of development. Originally it was simply the education of a freeman, as opposed to that of the servile classes — the education of a gentleman, in short. In this sense it marks that state of society when education, and all other advantages of any account, belonged to a privileged class, who sharply distinguished themselves from the lower classes as freemen, gentlemen, nobles, etc. These had all the property, all the authority, all the social advantages, and consequently all the education which deserved the name. They alone possessed the means for any generous culture. If others had any education, it was such as they picked up under great disadvantages, and hence necessarily confined to the commonest things — to a few processes immediately useful, without any reference to its influence upon the mind itself.

A liberal education, then, was from the beginning, according to the standard of the times, an enlarged education, an education aiming to develop the mental powers, to liberalize and enfranchise the soul. A liberal education has always been the noblest education which was to be had — a real drawing out and unfolding of the nature, rather than the mechanical inculcation of a few rote-and-rule processes — an education valuable for its effects upon the mind and character rather than for the various dexterities and qualifications for business imparted by it. Always possessing this character, a truly liberal education, under the enlightenment of the present age, takes an enlarged view of human nature its capacities and destinies. It recognizes, indeed, as every-

thing right must recognize, the real interest of man as its end; but it cannot believe that interest to be wholly temporal and material, much less that it consists wholly in immediate mercenary advantages. It values at something real culture; it values education for itself, for its effects upon the soul as well as upon the purse; it aims primarily to liberalize and enfranchise the soul, that it may have a more just conception of its true interests, and greater ability to secure them.

With this explanation of what a college education should be, we are prepared to consider how far our course comes up to the ideal, and especially on what grounds it may claim for itself the title of liberal. And I remark in the first place, that the course of study pursued and to be pursued here deserves to be considered liberal, on account of its tendency to free the soul from the dominion of sense. From its dominion, I say — from its undue influence, not, of course, from all influence of sense. This would require more than monastic severity of discipline. I refer to no such austere mortification of sense as this; nor, on the other hand, to that lofty triumph over sense which is gained in the impassioned and spiritual contemplations of pure religion. Yet it is something of the same sort, as far as it goes, though obtained through a very different medium, and unsanctified by the same holy object of contemplation.

From our earliest years we find ourselves surrounded by material objects; which address themselves to our senses, and solicit and receive a large part of our attention. Our sensations are wholly determined from without, independently of our own efforts, and there is great danger of our giving

ourselves up entirely to their influence, and thus becoming the sport of external impulses. This is the case with the lower animals, and there is much in the lowest forms of human life which approaches it. To follow sense requires no exertion, as it is only obeying the present impulse. It is only to eat when hungry, to sleep when exhausted, to avoid what gives pain, to seek what gives pleasure, and thus obey the strongest impulse for the time being, without any forethought or will of one's own. Such is life with the savage, and it becomes different with man only as he is emancipated from sense by education. As each individual is drawn out and developed by education, he becomes more and more separated from the common, passive instrumentalities of nature. All study tends in some degree to this emancipation. As an independent and determined concentration of the mind upon some particular subject, any special study is a rebellion against the dictation of sense.

But while this is true of all studies, there are certain studies which are specially adapted to carrying out this emancipation from sense in its higher relations, as the mathematics and metaphysics. Upon these, therefore, we chiefly rely for effecting this species of soul-emancipation. These have always been prominent studies in this college, and I trust ever will be. The idle clamor which has often been raised against them as "scholastic," "unpractical," etc., has been raised, in turn, by shallow pretenders, against all sound studies; and if heeded would banish from our colleges all but the most showy and flashy arts, and leave them but little above the level of fashionable boarding-schools for misses. Should a college course be reduced to the mere

acquisition of arts and accomplishments? Should not a college, rather, teach science, as the foundation of all the arts? Mathematics, metaphysics, etc., we are told, are unpractical; that is, they do not impart dexterities which can be turned to immediate account. But do they not lay the foundation for the useful arts? Ask the land surveyor, the navigator, the mechanician, the reasoner, the thinker, where he got his art, and he will point you to the one or the other of these sciences as its chief source. But aside from any particular arts which may be founded upon these sciences, they tend more than any other studies to emancipate the soul from sense, and thus give it that independence and freedom of movement which are essential to all fruitful thought, and hence to all useful art.

Mathematics is the science of quantity. It has to do with the how much, whether in space, time, number or degree—all abstract conceptions, or mere forms of thought. Pure mathematics is an absolute science, the mere development of the contents of certain conceptions. While we conceive of space as admitting of all possible relative positions and forms, we conceive of this, as well as of time and degree, as susceptible of infinite divisions and subdivisions, and this, too, irrespective of any material things or actual created objects, occupying space, existing in time, or exhibiting degrees of force, density, or any other quality. And so also number, or discrete quantity, as it is called, does not necessarily suppose the existence of particular things, but may represent merely a succession of like portions of pure space and time, or degrees of force, etc.

Here, then, is a science, not only cut quite clear of sense,

but which actually dominates over sense, by imposing its laws upon all sensible objects, as was seen by Pythagoras of old, who taught that number, or quantitative proportion, was the generating principle of all things, since it determined their form. And what must be the effect of such a science in emancipating the soul from sense? It carries the thoughts quite over this material crust of things and sets them afloat under the most unrestrained conditions. While engaged in it, during the crisis of absorption in its most abstract processes, the mind not only triumphs over, but is absolutely divorced from, sense.

And even in its applications the science still hovers above the particular sensible objects to which it is applied, and determines them, rather than is determined *by* them. At most, it applies to things only ideally; it waits on observation, but only to perform what sense cannot do, to determine by its calculations and formulas the exact positions, times, and degrees of things. Hence, even here, it disciplines the mind to superiority to sense; and by the vast distances in space, the remote periods in time, and the exact ideal determinations to which it carries the thoughts, tends to make them denizens of the universe, and break the power of local, material objects over them. Accordingly mathematical studies not only vindicate to themselves the right to a place in a course of liberal study, but to a high and commanding place, as one of the most effective means of freeing the mind from the dominion of sense. Aside from their great and acknowledged usefulness, in their determinations of the distances, times, forms, masses, forces, and numbers of objects — results so important that we could

scarcely live without them — they must ever remain one of the great gymnastics by which the mind is trained to that superiority to sense so essential to all free, independent and effective action.

Much the same may be said of the study of metaphysics, as a means of disenthraling the soul from sense. Metaphysics proposes to itself nothing less than to penetrate to the very essence of being, to go wholly below phenomena and all sensible qualities, and behold, as it were, face to face, the very nature of matter, of the soul, and even of God himself. This has been its high aspiration in all ages, and probably always will be, with however little prospect of ever being able to realize it. The human mind is ever pressing upon the infinite. The reason is ever struggling toward unity. It always expects to be able to resolve co-ordinate causes into higher and still higher unities, until it reaches an absolute unity, a sole first cause. This, with Pythagoras, as already observed, was number or proportion; with the Eleatic philosophers it was the one general underlying substance of all phenomenal existence; with Plato it was the world of ideas, existing potentially in the human mind and actually in the mind of God, constituting the true, revealed in the beautiful, and working together in the grand procession of things for the just and the good; while with the Christian philosopher it is an uncaused, personal creator, independent of nature, and yet "God all and in all." It is in grasping at these grand conceptions that the mind is carried farthest away from sense to its highest point of ideality. Of all systems of mere philosophy no one has done so much in raising its disciples above sense as Platonism, and this for the

reason that it exalts the mind to higher and more spiritual conceptions. Indeed, it knows no other world than the ideal, carrying the mind through a grand gradation of ideals from beginning to end. It is confessedly the noblest instrument of culture ever wrought out by the unassisted reason of man, and it is so chiefly on account of its lofty idealism.

But aside from these lofty problems of metaphysics proper, which are ever destined, perhaps, to be the object of the aspiration and faith of man, rather than of his positive knowledge, much of the same effect is produced by the study of mere psychology. Psychology, to be sure, is an inductive science, but the observation from which the inductions are made is of a spiritual subject, wholly inappreciable by sense. The observation being wholly internal, can be conducted only by the utmost abstraction from sensible objects. Thus the subject of observation is spiritual, and the act of observation spiritual. The whole study is of the most subtle character — subtle in its nature, in its processes, and in its results. Every step in it is taken only by withdrawing from sense, and is therefore a direct triumph over sense. And thus it is that metaphysical philosophy, in all its forms, conspires with the mathematical sciences, as special instrumentalities, in effecting that disenthralment of the soul from sense, so essential to all free and fruitful action.

Secondly, we claim for the course of study, as pursued in this college, the title of liberal, on account of its tendency to free the soul from the dominion of the imagination. I do not here, of course, refer to the cultivated and trained imagination, which has learned its proper sphere, and be-

come the obedient servant of the reason in carrying out its high behests — as such it needs no restraining — but to the imagination in its rude, untutored state, when it is more under the control of sense and feeling than of reason. In this state, aroused by external sensations or internal feelings, it fills the chambers of the soul with an array of fantastic fictions, which too often pass for realities. In obedience to that general tendency of the human mind to search for causes, or, perhaps I should say, as a result of that inherent conviction, that every change is effected by some operating power, the untrained imagination fancies a personal cause in each case. It is thus that rude nations people every element with supernatural beings, to account for the various changes which transpire around them. We see this tendency exhibited conspicuously in the early history of the Greeks. As remarked by a recent writer: —

The legends of that lively race may mostly be traced to that sort of awe or wonder with which simple and uneducated minds regard the changes and movements of the natural world. The direct and easy way in which the imagination of such persons accounts for marvelous phenomena is to refer them to the operation of persons. When the attention is excited by the regular movements of sun and moon and stars, by the alternations of day and night, by the recurrence of the seasons, by the rising and falling of the seas, by the ceaseless flow of rivers, by the gathering of clouds, the rolling of thunder, and the flashing of lightning, by the operation of life in the vegetable and animal world, in short, by any exhibition of an active and motive power, it is natural for uninstructed minds to consider such changes and movements as the work of divine persons.

Nor are such excess and crudeness of imagination confined wholly to primitive times and rude states of society. They undoubtedly indicate a want of right and sound culture, but

not necessarily of all culture. Considerable knowledge of certain sorts may co-exist with a wild capriciousness of imagination. It is only by long and sound training that we learn to discriminate clearly between imagined figments and valid knowledge. These figments are found among the contents of the mind, and are easily mistaken for veritable knowledge. There is more or less admixture of fancy with fact in all untrained minds, and persons of a strong imagination, perhaps, never learn wholly to separate them. We see how much care is requisite in order to discriminate the two from each other in the article of telling the truth. A little carelessness here, as every one must have observed, so confuses the two elements in the mind that one is scarcely able to discriminate the true from the fictitious. Persons of unveracious habits soon reach a state in which they can relate as fact the wildest tissue of fiction, and with a confidence and *naiveté* utterly astounding to a truth-discriminating hearer. Indeed, the imagination is always, as Bishop Butler calls it, a "forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding itself beyond its sphere." It is ever conjuring up images which it would impose upon us as realities. Like all our faculties, it is indispensable in its place, but a source of infinite embarrassment and confusion when out of its place.

Now, while all accurate and careful study tends to chasten the imagination, and confine it to its appropriate sphere, the study of the physical sciences furnishes the best corrective to the obtrusiveness of this power. Mental science; indeed, analyzes the operations of the faculty, and points out the unreal nature of its figments, but natural science curbs and restrains the faculty itself. It pushes it back from a vast

domain which it has taken possession of, and reclaims that domain to itself on the most undoubted title. Natural science, whether as a study of facts or a study of laws, is a most wholesome corrective to the imagination. Facts are opposed to fancies, and the more the mind is stored with them the less room there is for that imposing array of fancies with which the untutored imagination fills the soul. Imagination has been called a "dying sense"; its images, therefore, are the ghosts of departed perceptions, and often usurp their place. These ghosts must be dispossessed of their usurped rights, and the study of the facts of nature is the sorcery by which they are to be exorcised. The study of nature is a trained and careful use of the senses, in order to ascertain the real facts which exist there. It is not trusting to mere sensation, but is the application of intelligence to sensation. In this study nothing is trusted to but veritable perceptions, which are equally removed from sensations and fancies. There is no room for fiction here; all fancies are thrust aside as impertinent, and the sole question is, what are the exact facts in the case. Such exactitude is the best possible training for the imagination.

But natural science has its laws as well as its facts. It becomes science, indeed, only as its facts are connected by general conceptions which both simplify and explain them. These laws are certain supposed modes of interaction among substances, which suggest a rational ground for various observed phenomena, and connect them together by a common thread. The deducing of these laws from the facts is the philosophy of nature, and, as such, is a portion of that study of the abstract, which is the special corrective of the domi-

nation of sense. But it is also a corrective of the domination of the imagination. As these deduced laws of nature are general conceptions suggesting a rational ground for the various facts and changes which we witness around us, they remove the necessity for the assumption of the direct action of personal agents in order to account for these phenomena. Natural science thus banishes from nature the polytheistic machinery of the untutored and awe-struck imagination. This anarchy of deities retires before the march of science, being replaced by the unifying conceptions of the understanding. As saith the poet:—

The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old religion,
The power, the beauty and the majesty,
That had their haunts in dale or piny mountain,
Or forest by slow stream, or pebbly spring,
Or chasm or wat'ry depths — all these have vanished ;
They live no longer in the faith of reason.

But none the less does the real Deity retain his place and influence in nature. These laws of nature are but rational causes, that is, conceptions of certain modes of interaction among substances, framed to satisfy the demands of the reason and the purposes of science. In themselves, the assumed causes or principles of action are wholly occult, or unknown in their nature. To say, for instance, that all the varying motions of the heavenly bodies are referable to a general law of attraction, is only expressing a general fact, which embraces a multitude of particular ones, and expressing it in terms calculated to suggest, from the analogies of our experience, a formal cause for the phenomena. It does

not at all explicate the nature of attraction, or tell us in what it consists. That attractive power, in itself, may be nothing but the direct agency of God. It is certainly as conceivable that it is this, as that it is the actual influence of bodies of inert matter over each other, which are separated by almost illimitable tracts of intervening space. And so of the other laws of nature. They are mere unifying conceptions; and as such, they are significant indications of the tendency of the human mind—not, certainly, to no first cause—but to a single First Cause. The banishment of polytheism, therefore, is only a step toward the establishment of a general and all-comprehending Providence of the “one living and true God.” Thus, while natural science lays the spectral deities of the imagination, it evokes from the depths of our consciousness the intimations of a single, every-where-present God.

Thirdly, we claim for our course of education here the title of liberal, because it has a tendency to set free the tongue. Perhaps it may be thought this is quite an uncalled-for result of education. You may be disposed to think that the tongue is quite free enough without any special training; and possibly your private experience of its power may have often reminded you of the aptness of the Apostle’s description of it, as “a fire, a world of iniquity, setting on fire the course of nature, and itself set on fire of hell; an unruly evil, which no man can tame.” But it is just because it is this unruly evil in its untutored state that it needs training—not, indeed, to make it less free, but to give it a higher freedom in the expression of the pure dictates of taste, of reason, and of conscience; a freedom which

shall never be choked by passion, nor paralyzed by shame, on account of the unworthiness of the sentiments which it is uttering. The tongue, to be sure, is, in one sense, free enough without education, but it is coarse, and ribald, and vulgar. It vibrates with electric rapidity under the agitations of passion — darts out malice, spits out hate, flashes out envy, and rattles out ribaldry and billingsgate, according to the prevailing passion of the moment. But this is little more than a spasmodic freedom. There can be no rational freedom of the tongue any more than there can be of the soul, without culture. The same tongue which is so glib under the inspiration of passion falters and fails in the expression of all connected and elevated thought.

The true relation of thought and speech is happily indicated in the Latin by the words employed to signify the two processes, *ratio* and *oratio*, that is, the reason and the mouth-reason. All true, intelligent and fruitful discourse is but reason externalized, thought flowing out in speech. And yet speech is an art quite distinct from thought. Though we cannot speak intelligently without thoughts to utter, it does not follow that we can utter skillfully, without special training in the art, any thoughts which we may chance to have. We might just as reasonably expect one to show himself at once an expert mechanic, who had learned the principles of the art wholly from books, without any actual practice. Nay, more than this: we might as reasonably place timber and tools before one who knows nothing of house-carpentry either theoretically or practically, and expect him with these means to proceed to construct an elegant house. The mind which has thoughts merely has

barely the materials of speech — neither the rules nor the skill for using them. In order thoroughly to set free the tongue, the mind must be supplied not only with the general material of thought, but with the theoretical principles for its right expression, while there must be added to all actual practice in its expression. Here, then, is a demand for a large and important department of instruction. And how is this demand met in our college course?

I answer, it is met, and in the most effectual manner as I conceive, by the special studies of rhetoric and the different languages, particularly the ancient classical languages. Rhetoric, with the accompanying exercises in composition, criticism, elocution, declamation and debate, is wholly devoted to teaching the art of speaking and writing well. This is its sole business and aim. It imparts both the principles and the practice of the art, as far as this can be done under the limited conditions of college life. It has not the advantage, to be sure, of mature minds, filled with the fruits of experience, and hence apprehending the subject under its most practical relations, to which to impart its instructions; nor can it call to its aid those great occasions, as they arise in the operations of general society, which give eloquence to the tongue and vigor to the pen. It cannot, therefore, make perfect speakers and writers, since the conditions for this do not exist, and cannot exist, with so immature subjects. Experience, wisdom, responsibility, are required to perfect eloquence and style, and these cannot exist in youth, whether in college or out. In this, as in other departments of college study, the aim is to lay the foundation for future development — to impart such instruction as will give one

the use and control of his mind, and open to him the various magazines of thought, whence he is to take his armor for the conflict of life. And this is all that can be done in youth under any course of training. The study of rhetoric and its accompanying exercises brings the mind to the contemplation of style in writing and manner in speaking as distinct arts. It awakens it to a sense of fitness in expression, and teaches it how to attain that fitness. It thus places before the mind the true ideal, and gives it the means and the impulse to aspire to it. With such a foundation laid in college, its principles may readily be carried out in after life, in the study of general literature, and the manly exercises of public speaking and writing.

And with rhetoric the study of foreign languages conspires to produce the same result. A foreign language can be acquired only by studying it in its principles and elements. It compels attention to these, and hence is a much more effective means of training in the general principles of language, than the study of authors in our mother tongue. And this is especially the case with the ancient classical languages. Besides that we find in them a fuller and happier development of general linguistic principles than in any of the modern languages, they are far more potent in compelling attention from their completely antique cast and style of thought. Nay, more; so different is the whole manner of conception and arrangement of words in these languages, compared with our own, that a sentence to be done from the Latin or Greek into English must be conceived and constructed entirely anew. Hence every exercise in translation is a direct exercise in mental composition, as well as verbal

expression. They are thus the best possible guides to the young, in composition and expression — placing before the mind (as is requisite for beginners) the materials, and requiring that they should be reconstructed into good English sentences, expressed in good English words.

Besides, the Latin and Greek form the basis of nearly all the cultivated modern languages, and constitute the models on which a large part of their most valuable literature has been constructed. The Greek and Latin authors were all-in-all at the revival of letters in the Middle Ages, and for centuries furnished the inspiration of nearly every author who wrote in any tongue. Nay, even at the present day they contain many of the finest specimens of literature — in poetry, eloquence, philosophy and history — to be found in any language. Thus a large part of the highest spirit of literature is either directly treasured in these venerable languages, or intimately associated with them. All modern history and literature have been so filtered through them as to receive more or less of the classic aroma in the passage, like the smoke of the Turk's pipe which is drawn through a compartment filled with sweet-scented waters.

It is thus that the study of rhetoric, and of our own and foreign languages, furnishes one with the words, the rules and the art of expression, till the tongue, which once stammered, and faltered, and blundered in expressing the simplest ideas, has become so endued with eloquence that nothing seems too hard for it to express — that no subject is too profound or lofty, too abstract or intricate, to be clothed by it with the drapery of an appropriate and splendid diction.

Finally, we claim for our course of study the title of liberal, because the grand tendency of the whole is to free the soul from the dominion of passion. Passion, as embracing the various mental perturbations, whether occasioned by local physical causes in the organism, or by the perceptions of the mind, stands opposed to reason. Feeling is not properly a cognition, or if it be, it is the lowest form of cognition. It is blind compared with intelligence. It is in part, to be sure, consequent upon intellectual perceptions, and varies in dignity with the character of those perceptions ; but even here it is only the servitor of intelligence. Feelings are right only when consequent upon a truly rational view of things. When not thus consequent, when not warranted by reason, when in any way excessive, as they always are when they assume the form of passions, they are opposed to reason. The development of reason, therefore, must tend to the suppression of passion, or excessive and unworthy feeling. It tends to give intelligence the mastery among the various mental impulses. Reason developed takes a clear and comprehensive view of things. The mind is no longer under the blind guidance of the false and distorted feelings consequent upon the crude perceptions of sense and imagination. Reason is clear, and calm, and comprehensive, and bids away all such chimeras from the mind. An education, therefore, which tends to free the soul from the dominion of sense and of the imagination, as we have endeavored to show to be the case with the education here given, must tend, also, to free the soul from the dominion of passion.

This must be allowed to be, at least, the theoretical tendency of all sound education. And we believe it does, in

most cases, actually have something of this effect. We believe soundly educated men are less under the dominion of passion than the uneducated. But while we cannot but admit this fact, and claim for our course of education here all the influence in this direction which can come from mere enlightenment, we are aware of its inadequacy fully to free the soul from the dominion of passion. And what can be stronger proof of a native depravity of heart in man than that it is so! Here we see that even the most fully developed reason is insufficient to restrain the excesses of passion. History shows this by the most conspicuous examples. The "law of the members" is too strong for the "law of the mind." Passion will not down at the bidding of reason; and reason, however much developed, is not always sufficiently wakeful to perceive its encroachment. Hence the balance of the mind is evidently disturbed by some great disarrangement, since the less worthy power is found to prevail over the more worthy.

We are compelled, therefore, in the last resort, to turn away from all science as a sufficient training for the passions. Their radical and fatal excess can be cured only by the restraining and transforming influences of the Divine Spirit. Indeed, as sound educators, looking at human nature as it is, we must reject, at least in its highest acceptance, the maxim of the great Roman orator and philosopher, that "philosophy is the cure of souls." History shows that this cure lies in religion alone. And accordingly, while we claim for science and literature a strong restraining influence, we are not ashamed to say that we turn, for the last and highest discipline of the soul, to the renovating energy

and purifying power of the religion of Christ. If in connection with the doctrines of science and the humanities of literature we shall be able also to convey into the minds of our pupils the doctrines and spirit of this holy religion, then, and only then, we shall consider our work done, and well done.

Such, gentlemen, is my conception of what a college education should be, and the ideal of what we hope to make it here. How far we are to realize this ideal will depend very much upon the co-operation and support which we receive from the friends of the institution. With proper aid from without, we hope to be able so to conduct its internal affairs, that your institution, now comparatively feeble, shall at least keep pace with the progress of other things, and gradually acquire the influence which its commanding position at the center of the state entitles it to. And if it shall only do this, who can fully foresee the strength and honor which will gather around it from generation to generation. A well-endowed and well-conducted college is a most mighty and beneficent power. When the capitol of a great nation is reared, which is to witness for ages the deliberations of the fathers of the state, and whence are to issue the laws for the government of the people, when a vast territory has been penetrated by roads, which are to remain forever highways for the traveler, a great work has been done; but not so great as when that territory has been dotted all over with schoolhouses and colleges. Capitols may crumble, roadbeds may be obliterated by eruptions from beneath, or the gradual attrition of the elements, but intelligence cannot be destroyed. While the graceful temples of Greece, and the

proud capitol, and even the granite-paved roads of Rome, are in ruins, Pindar and Plato, Horace and Cicero, still sing as sweetly and discourse as sublimely as they did amid their native olive-groves, or on their Sabine farms. The influence of education is silent, but mighty. More subtle in its workings than electricity, more pervasive than light, it has been ordained as one of the great regenerating powers of the world, and, with morality and religion, constitutes the three-fold cord by which Divine Providence is drawing man on to his sublime and glorious destiny.

RELIGION AND PHILANTHROPY

DELIVERED BEFORE "THE SOCIETY OF MISSIONARY INQUIRY"

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

JUNE 24, 1856

RELIGION AND PHILANTHROPY.

THE acceptance of an invitation to address a society of young men preparing for the Christian ministry, and associated specifically for the purpose of missionary inquiry, seems to require that I should select a theme bearing more or less directly upon the great commission of the Master whom we all profess to serve. But you will not, I know, be too exacting upon this point. You will readily, I dare say, allow me any reasonable latitude. You will not require that I should speak directly and specifically upon the subject of missions. A subject so dear to the church has necessarily been often and ably handled. The exigencies, the trials and the triumphs connected with the progress of so glorious a cause have called out appeals so stirring, vindications so triumphant, defenses so eloquent, and anthems so exultant, that I shall readily be excused for declining to mar the beauty and impressiveness of so grand a testimony by any poor efforts of mine on the present occasion. It will be enough if I do not wholly lose sight of this subject. I am to speak this evening to young men preparing for the Christian ministry, and who expect to devote their lives to the great work of reforming and saving their fellow-men. Now this work of evangelization may be considered, on one side, as the cause of God, and on the other as the cause of man. It is God's

truth working for man's good. It is deity laying hold of and elevating humanity. The minister, while he is the priest of God, is the servant of man. In serving God we the most effectually serve our race. Evangelization, therefore, has two phases to it—Godward, it is religion; manward, it is philanthropy. And this will constitute my theme,

RELIGION AND PHILANTHROPY.

These words express nearly all that is excellent in the character and conduct of men. They designate the two great forces which are at work in the reformation and regeneration of our race. All the means and instrumentalities which are employed for the improvement of man are originated and sustained by these forces. It is by their united action that society has been advanced thus far in its progress, and is destined to be carried on to perfection. The love of God and the love of man are the grand motives to all good. A brief exhibition and illustration of the relations of these two great reforming and regenerating forces, not only as they are in themselves, but as they have actually appeared in the history of the world, cannot be uninteresting or uninstructive. Forces in themselves entirely harmonious and conspiring, they have often been drawn into sharp contrast, and even antagonism with each other, by the perversity of man. In this, as in so many other cases, what God hath joined together man has not feared to put asunder.

Their true relation is easily exhibited. Religion is primarily love to God, philanthropy, primarily love to man. According to one derivation, religion is the bond of piety or

filial affection to God, while according to another it is the sum of those solemn emotions which we are conscious of in reviewing our life and conduct. In either case it is the voice of conscience when confronted with its Maker — the solemn feelings of penitence, reverence, obligation, love, which we have when our inmost being is laid open to the view of God, and our whole life, as it were, is brought up and examined in the light of his countenance. Religion is thus the highest, the most comprehensive, and the most authoritative sentiment of the human soul. By rightful authority it presides over the whole life and conduct, and when elicited by proper incitements, and directed by proper precepts, as is the case under the Christian system, leads to the most beneficent results. Such a sentiment, under proper guidance, cannot, of course, be silent on so important a subject as our duty to our fellow-men. Indeed, the Scriptures, the record of the Christian faith, are filled with precepts and examples on this subject. The very spirit and essence of Christianity are concentrated in that little snatch of choral song which broke from the skies at the advent of its Founder into the world : —

Glory to God in the highest,
On earth peace, good-will to men !

God first, and man next ; this is the order and sum of Christianity. It magnifies God and ennobles man. It not only enjoins the love of God, but the love of man — and the love of man as the creature of God, thus making the love of man almost a part of the love of God. As a creature of God, as an immortal and responsible being, even the most degraded specimen of the race is commended to our

sympathy and regard. If made by God, if cared for and loved by him, he certainly should be by his fellow. The Christian religion is as superior to all other religions in its humanity as in the tone and character of its piety. Some humane precepts and examples, doubtless, may be found in pagan authors and pagan books of religion — sentiments, it may be, rising almost to the moral dignity and beauty of that contained in the “golden rule” of our Savior; but such sentiments in any but Christian authors are only rare and occasional — pearls quite covered up and lost in the mass of superstitious rubbish by which they are surrounded. It cannot be said of any heathen system of religion that its general spirit and substance are humane. On the contrary, this is eminently the spirit of the Gospel. What can be said of no other religious system, it outlaws no class, and denounces none, except for their sins. It knows no distinction between men except what is based upon character. The high and the low are alike offered forgiveness on condition of faith and repentance, and are alike rejected if they adhere to their sins. While it frowns away the proud, unrelenting Pharisee, it receives the penitent publican; while it pronounces its heaviest woes upon the self-righteous scribes and doctors of the law, it beckons back the repentant prodigal, and makes the Mary out of whom the Savior cast seven devils one of the honored women who followed him wherever he went, even to the cross and the sepulcher.

Accordingly, the spread of Christianity has everywhere proved the birth of philanthropy. Indeed, philanthropy is grandly inaugurated in the very act of propagating Christianity. Its disciples are commanded to preach the Gospel

to every creature, and in obedience to this command Christian men and women have gone forth to seek out and save the lost, at the sacrifice of every earthly comfort — have left kindred and friends, happy climes and happy homes, the sweets of social intercourse, the quiet enjoyments of retirement and study, and all the unnumbered decencies and pleasures of civilized life — to consort with the most degraded specimens of humanity, enveloped in filth, benighted by ignorance and brutalized by vice; to accompany them in their pursuits and their migrations, to thread with them the tangled jungle or roam the wild mountain, to dwell where they dwell and lodge where they lodge, to die where they die, and with them to be buried, that they may rescue them from their darkness and woe, and fit them for the kingdom of heaven. This is philanthropy indeed — philanthropy in its divinest form. And just in proportion as these efforts at evangelization are successful in any part of the world, a spirit of philanthropy springs up in the community and spreads through all the departments of life.

The world over, philanthropy is found only in the train of Christianity. The most enlightened nations of heathen antiquity, with many elements of civilization, were grossly deficient in humanity. Even the Greeks, who, not without reason, considered the surrounding nations as barbarians, had but faint conceptions of a common brotherhood among men, and but little of that fellow-feeling and sympathy which, with the Christian, makes another's woes his own. Their Bible was the Iliad, a book of charming simplicity and beauty, and relieved by many touching scenes of tenderness and pathos between particular friends, but after all a

book of fearful carnage from beginning to end, involving both gods and men in the contest. Even at Athens woman was banished from society, and the great mass of the people but little cared for; while at Sparta, every tie of home and affection was rudely sundered to meet the demands of an iron military discipline, the like of which, perhaps, the world has never witnessed — children being taken from their parents at a tender age and brought up at public tables on a sort of blood-pudding, called black broth, and couched upon bundles of reeds by night, while they were directed to cultivate their dexterity and courage by theft and murder among the despised Helots and Perioeci who surrounded them.

The gods of Greece, though not of so malignant a character as those of eastern nations, were yet in early times not unfrequently propitiated by human sacrifices, as is seen in the story of Iphigenia, which even the cultivated Athenians of the age of Pericles did not blush to witness exhibited on the stage with all the pomp of the tragic art. With a literature singularly rich and refined, no treatise has descended to us devoted specifically to the interests of humanity, or evincing large and generous views of the brotherhood of man. Greece has left many monuments which will never die — books, statues, temples, fortresses — but not even the shattered remains of an almshouse or an asylum. Much less has pagan Rome left anything of this sort. Bristling in every part with the implements of war, Rome was more of a camp than a state. A few reflecting minds, nursed in retirement, sometimes expressed noble sentiments, one of which, at least, still retains its place among the humane sen-

timents of modern times—"I am a man, and therefore am interested in whatever is human";—but such sentiments are not common even in the writings of the noblest of her authors. Rome was the conquering, domineering mistress of the world, and neither knew nor cared anything about humanity. A nation whose serious employment was war, and whose favorite pastime was gladiatorial shows, could have exercised but few of the charities of life.

Such was the condition of Greece and Rome even in their best estate. But this estate they had fallen from before the introduction of Christianity, and had lost, among other things, nearly all the humane sentiments which they had ever possessed. Christianity found these once renowned states exhausted, prostrate, dying, but it soon breathed into them new life. And in nothing was this new life seen more than in the growing spirit of humanity, which began to diffuse itself through the community. It soon reached in its effects those who were the proper subjects for its exercise, the poor, the unfortunate and the distressed, who felt its influence, in the alms which they received, the houses of refuge which were erected for their comfort, and the exertions made for their improvement. At length it reached even the slave, and set him free (what, alas! it has not even yet done among us), and it has gone on emancipating one class after another, and correcting one abuse after another, till the present time.

The same results have followed the propagation of Christianity among heathen nations, in modern times. I need not detain you by a rehearsal of the tale of cruelty which has been borne back by modern missionaries from every

part of the dark domain of heathenism — of human sacrifices in one quarter, of the burning of widows in another, of the exposure of infants and the aged in another, of cruel tortures, and even crushings beneath the wheels of the ponderous car of their idol-gods in another, and the systematic grinding and trampling upon the helpless everywhere, till poor, oppressed human nature seemed no longer able to bear its burdens! You are all acquainted with these sad histories, and equally acquainted with the happy effects which have ensued from the diffusion of Christian truth in these same habitations of cruelty — of the direct abolition of many of these cruel rites and practices, the awakening of a general spirit of humanity and Christian love through large communities, and in some of the almost complete establishment of the humane sentiments and institutions of Christian lands. These facts are so notorious as to need no rehearsal here, and to all unprejudiced minds must be regarded as conclusively establishing the dependence of philanthropy upon Christianity. Such, then, is their true relation. But this relation has often been denied, and very different relations asserted to exist between them. Let us examine these asserted relations.

In the first place it is contended by many that philanthropy does not necessarily follow Christianity, but might as well precede it. In refutation of this assumption it would seem sufficient to reply, that it is entirely unsustained by facts — nay, that all the facts are directly against it. This has appeared in what has already been said. We have found philanthropy only in the train of Christianity; and not only so, all attempts to reverse this process have sig-

nally failed. For centuries it has been a favorite theory with the enemies, and with even some of the friends, of Christianity, that the most effectual way to improve men is to civilize them before attempting to Christianize them. This, I say, has been the theory of a large class of pretended or real philanthropists for centuries, and yet I am not aware that they have, in all this time, been able to adduce a single fact, either transpiring in the natural course of things or realized by experiment, tending to sustain their theory.

Projects of civilization on this plan have been much talked of, and some have been attempted, but all have signally failed. The results of such efforts were well brought out in a very careful and protracted examination of persons interested in such matters before a committee of the British Parliament in 1835. It there appeared that some missionary societies had pursued this method in certain cases, but in all without the least success; that in some cases the hearts of the bands of artisans, sent out to civilize heathen tribes, had failed them before they had reached the scene of their labors, and where this had not been the case, they had met with no success at all. And it seems to me that such a result might have been anticipated from the beginning.

The truth is, on such a plan, both the motives to labor, on the part of the agents employed, and the motives to reformation, on the part of those to be civilized, are quite inadequate to the demands of the case. Why should a mere artisan, or teacher even of human science, with no other motives than those drawn from this world, spend his days among filthy and degraded savages, when he might be so

much more comfortable and successful at home? And what could he expect to accomplish if he should conclude to do so? How could he hope, by any motives with which he is furnished, to induce the benighted barbarian to give up his wild habits, and adopt the quiet and peaceful arts of civilization? The savage has his religion, or superstition, which to him is as sacred and authoritative as that of the Christian to him. Indeed, the grosser the superstition the more universal its connection with the life and conduct of its devotees. All superstitions deal largely with forms and ceremonies; they have a ceremony connected with every act and situation in life. Nay, they ascribe a large part of the acts of life directly to their gods. A given course of life thus becomes religiously sacred in their eyes. It is all associated with and sanctified by their religion. The gods who have preserved them hitherto, and prospered them, as they imagine, in their present mode of life, would be angry with them, they think, if they should change it. Thus, when a chief of one of the tribes of Indians in Upper Canada was urged by the governor to induce his people to give up their wandering habits, and devote themselves to civilized pursuits, he promptly declined, saying, "Who knows but the munedoos (gods) would be angry with us for abandoning our own ways."

There can be no improvement in life unless there is first an improvement in the religion. While one feels that his religion requires a certain mode of life of him, you labor in vain to induce him to change it. The religion must first be changed, and then the mode of life may be changed in accordance. This is as certain as anything can be. How pre-

posterous, then, to attempt to change the habits of savages to those of civilized men, while still under the influence of their old superstitions! One religion can be displaced only by another. Civilization is no substitute for religion, and cannot take its place. It is the fruit of the Christian religion, and can exist, at least in its higher forms, only where that exists. We come, then, to the same conclusion here as before, that men can be civilized only by being first Christianized. False religions must be first displaced by the true, and then right modes of life may be substituted for those which are faulty.

It is truly surprising that a view so false should have been retained so long, and after all that has transpired to refute it in fact should still be retained. From the time of Christ to the present the spirit of trade and of gain has carried civilized men to all parts of the earth, and brought them into contact with the uncivilized of every grade and nation. They have dwelt with them, traded with them, exhibited their modes of life before them, and exercised their arts among them; and yet, where is the nation, or individual even, in any part of the world, who has been civilized by these means? Many have been corrupted thus, as all know, but we have yet to learn that any have been civilized. No! neither the spirit of gain nor mere philanthropy can reclaim men from heathenism. Nothing short of the love of God in the soul, flowing out in love to man — nothing short of a conviction of the lost condition of man by nature, and the necessity of a divine remedy for sin which has been provided in Christ, can furnish the motives and means requisite for evangelizing, and thus civilizing, the world.

And this is now, perhaps, universally admitted, in theory at least, by religious men. And yet is it always acted upon even by such? Are missionary operations always, even now, conducted wholly, and with full faith, upon the principle that evangelization must precede civilization? Is not too much reliance still placed upon mere civilizing processes? Is not teaching, as distinguished from preaching, of this nature? General education is unquestionably a civilizing rather than an evangelizing process. And can it succeed when resorted to previous to evangelization? If what has been said is true, and the teachings of experience can be relied upon, it would seem that the missionary, in the earlier stages of a mission at least, should bend all his efforts to the conversion of those to whom he is sent. He should strive to first get their hearts right, to show them a better religion, and bring them personally to embrace it, and then the way will be prepared for general instruction and other civilizing processes. This was the way in which Christ and his apostles proceeded, and we must believe it will always be found to be the most effectual way. But I must pass to another view of our subject.

Not only has philanthropy been placed before religion, but it has often been contended, and still is, more strenuously than ever perhaps, that philanthropy is all and religion nothing—that religion, properly, is only philanthropy. This, evidently, is an atheistic view; for if there be no religion, then there can be no God. Yet perhaps it does not always imply quite as much as this. The old Epicurean idea of the Deity, as sitting in undisturbed repose, neither soliciting the services nor noticing the actions of men, is not yet quite

renounced. There are multitudes even in Christian lands who regard God so habitually as afar off, and have so loose and vague views of their relations to him, that they hardly imagine themselves to owe him any duties or service. Nay, it is to be feared that there are professing Christians whose views of the divine requirements and of their personal obligations are so low that they scarcely conceive that their profession of Christianity imposes on them any other duties than those which pertain to man. Christians of this sort are ever crying "morals," "works," "deeds of the law"! Their views are so low that they almost leave God out of the account. Are they preachers? a riot or a fugitive-slave case is a perfect god-send to them, as furnishing a far more available text than can be found in Scripture. A temperance society, an anti-slavery society, and almost any reform society, is well-nigh as sacred in their eyes as the church. They have renounced the cure of souls for the cure of evils, and lost sight of God in their zeal for man. There is undoubtedly a large and increasing class of those calling themselves Christians who are of this character, in whom philanthropy is usurping the first place—in whose minds it stands decidedly first, and is fast becoming all.

But this tendency is not confined to the church, nor is it, perhaps, chiefly exhibited there. It is the effect of a poisonous leaven now largely at work in society—the rank outgrowth of a philosophy as deadly as the grave; for philanthropy, as a special *cultus*, must needs have its philosophy. This philosophy, variously denominated pantheism, naturalism, spiritualism, positivism, issues in the deification of humanity. Pantheism merges all in one; and this one sub-

stance you may, as you please, denominate either God or Nature. For decency's sake it is usually denominated God; but it might as well be the one as the other, as far as the interests of virtue and religion are concerned; for whether God or Nature it is no personality. This God or Nature comes to consciousness only in man and other sentient beings. Man, then, is God rising to consciousness, and taken in the endless succession of the race is the infinite and eternal God — indeed, the only God endowed with the higher attributes of intelligence. Man is thus deified, and deified in a higher and nobler sense than any other part of nature.

According to this philosophy, to be sure, all things are divine — the trees, the rocks, the clods of earth; but man is specially and pre-eminently divine — the noblest and the only adequate manifestation of God in his higher nature. While, therefore, the disciples of this school are devout worshipers of nature in all her forms, dwelling with wrapt devotion upon all her grand, inspiring and lovely objects, and not disdaining even the mean and the lowly — while they behold the Deity alike in the mountain and in the ocean, in the pumpkin and in the pigweed, they bow down with the profoundest reverence before man; and man, of course, just as he is. For not only is man divine, but all his faults and follies — his passions, his lusts, his crimes, which cry for vengeance, and all the unutterable thoughts and acts of wickedness. He is divine, every inch of him, and as such is, in his totality and with all his adjuncts, a fit object for our reverence and love. He is not merely commended to our sympathy as our fellow, but claims our devotion.

No wonder that such a philosophy should produce a false

philanthropy. It wrests man from his natural relations and places him before us as an object of worship. It converts philanthropy into religion, and thus makes it all and in all. It fairly eliminates religion as anything more than philanthropy. If a disciple of this philosophy worship at all, he must worship man; for there is no other God for him to worship. Inanimate nature, as unintelligent, he can worship in only a subordinate degree, and rising in his devotion through the different grades of animate beings, he reaches the highest object of worship in the most gifted of our race, and proclaims the consummation of devotion to be "the worship of genius."

It is in doctrines like these, as I conceive, that much of the mock philanthropy of our times has had its origin. Not that these doctrines, in their integrity and full significance, have been very widely diffused in the community; but scraps and fragments of them have been thrown about in all directions by popular lecturers, pamphleteers, and newspaper writers, till the public mind has become deeply tinctured with them. Men have been presented with the bright side of them, and have been caught by their glare. Of genuine philanthropy, begotten by right views of man and his relations, there can hardly be too much; but of this spurious philanthropy, our age has seen enough and more than enough. With all its pretensions it is yet a philanthropy of words rather than of deeds — either simpering and sighing like a sick girl, or swelling and swaggering like a bully. While its sentimental moods find expression in beautiful words or beautiful tears, its more energetic feelings vent themselves in violent declamation, wrangling and fisticuffs.

When it ceases to be pensive and musing, it becomes violent and wrathful, and goes at the work of reform with a sort of Jehu-like vengeance and dispatch. This, plainly, is not the kind of philanthropy to reach and eradicate the deep-seated evils of the human heart. It is not the philanthropy to carry one through privations, toils, and even death, for the good of others. By rejecting religion for its foundation it loses all its power — by assuming to be all, it really becomes nothing.

But again — swinging to the other extreme after the manner of the human mind — it is sometimes maintained, that religion is all and philanthropy nothing. This view ignores humanity, as the former ignores Deity. Like that, and scarcely less fatally, it separates two elements which properly belong together, and are wholesome when together, but, like disengaged gases, are noxious when apart.

Of this sort is the religion of the dogmatist, who is so penetrated and possessed by the doctrine as to lose sight of its practical application. With him religion is all theory and no practice, all plan and no appeal, all law and no Gospel. It is thrown quite back from all contact with earth — shot quite over the world and its realities — and becomes little more than a doctrine of God and redemption as a scheme — a plan reaching from everlasting to everlasting. This is not, perhaps, a leading fault in the religious character and thinking of the present day — the tendencies now, indeed, are rather in the opposite direction — but looking back into the past, we see the sturdy dogmatist stalking in the dim distance, the most conspicuous figure on the stage of action. The Augustines, the Calvins, the Hopkinses

and the Emmonses of the church stand out prominently in her history, and have exerted a controlling influence upon the general type and style of Christian character—a type of character, however, now fast passing away, and faulty as it has shown itself to be, not likely, perhaps, to be replaced by anything much better.

The religion of mere sentiment and passive feeling is of this sort; that dainty, fastidious, quietistic religion, which flourishes only in the gloom of the cloister, or the dimly-lighted and softly-cushioned church—a religion which is nursed by pensive musings and solemn music, which glows amid the soft perfumes and luxurious furnishings of the parlor, or within the solemn walls of a convent, where the Babel-roar of the huge, weltering world is never heard. What can such a religion do for perishing man? It may calm and soothe the breast of the possessor, but for all aggressive effect upon the evils of life and the powers of darkness it is utterly powerless; with all its show of devotion it is little more than a species of refined self-indulgence. A Christian of this sort is too fastidious and dainty for philanthropic efforts; he shrinks from all contact with man, and, like the tortoise, drawing in and safely securing each extremity within his impervious crust, he heeds not the roar without, till at length, aroused from his profound repose by extraordinary commotions, he timidly thrusts out his head to learn the cause, when, alas! too late, he finds himself and the whole community tossed by the convulsions of the final overthrow.

Again, the religion of fashion, of form, and of studied propriety, is of this sort. This phase of religion piques

itself upon its dignity and decorum. It moves among men, to be sure, but with a calmness and a reserve which are rarely attracted, and never ruffled by what is transpiring around. It is not so much fastidious as indifferent—it is proud rather than prudish. It can hardly be said, like that impartial messenger of which Horace speaks, to knock indifferently at the door of the hut and the palace, but wherever it does enter it maintains a dignity and a propriety which are altogether above criticism. It is so decorous and polite that it would not for a world disturb a slumbering conscience, nor raise an unpleasant emotion in any breast. Every public service is a lesson in politeness and propriety. Young men bow down before it, and old men do it reverence. Indeed, it is a special favorite with the "silver grays," and may always calculate upon the support of the "upper ten"!

This religion of dignity, propriety and form, of course can have but little to do with philanthropy. It is altogether too bustling and exciting a business, if not too vulgar. To visit an almshouse, to preach to the poor, to enter a brothel, to cast devils out of Magdalens, to go to a temperance meeting, to reclaim inebrates, or rush into a crowd to rescue a fugitive slave, just to be dragged back into bondage, but ill befits the calm decorum and profound formality of the pet preacher of the fashionable classes. Such a preacher must deal but little with religion, and entirely eschew politics; and politics he will find it convenient to interpret as embracing about everything pertaining to the moral and social condition of man. He must not preach against slavery, for this would be disturbing the compromises of the constitution

(now, indeed, rather badly disturbed, anyhow), and would be likely to endanger the Union, and thus ruin the trade—in cotton and other things—between the North and the South. He must not preach on temperance, for this might lead to a war over the wine-bottle and the rum-jug, in which war, very probably, some of his own dear parishioners might suffer! Nor must he preach on licentiousness, for this would be altogether too indecent a subject for the pulpit, and quite likely by implications might hurt the feelings of some of his hearers! He would thus be completely shut up unto faith, for he would be obliged to dwell wholly in ideal regions, touching upon nothing whatever which seriously affects life and conduct. He would, in short, be like the minister we have read of—and who so greatly pleased his hearers—that had nothing to do with either politics or religion!

But, thank God, religion is not always exhibited thus in caricature. It is not always found dissevered thus in its elements, and presented in a one-sided, distorted and fantastic form. Pure religion and undefiled is not, we hope, without its witnesses in all parts of the Christian world. It is found in all its robustness and beauty in many a heart. It is seen, at the same time, drawing its support from God, and bestowing its blessings upon man. It is the ornament of many of the fairest characters of our race, and the source of blessings unnumbered wherever it goes. Bringing the soul into intercourse with God, and transfusing it with the calmness, the grandeur, and the beauty of heaven, it inspires a love for our fellow, and confers on him an importance, of which mere worldly philanthropy has no conception. To such an one philanthropy is no godless work, it is the natural fruit

of a pious heart, and invested with all the sacredness of a high religious duty. While philanthropy, without religion, is either sentimental and simpering, or noisy and extravagant, the philanthropy which flows from true piety is calm, gentle and diffusive, embracing all in the arms of a universal love. A mere worldly philanthropy can, at best, but imitate its forms, without ever reaching its spirit. Whatever excellence it has it owes to the general prevalence and influence of Christianity. And yet, with a singular spirit of ingratitude, it often puts on airs, and parades itself in invidious contrast to religion — like the Hottentot youth (to adopt an illustration of Dr. Franklin, applied to the infidelity of Thomas Paine), who, when he has attained to manly years, turns around and beats his mother as evidence of his manhood. Philanthropy is so bright a jewel that it is sure to be worn — if not by the Christian, yet by the infidel, and with all the greater ostentation, like the tawdry ornaments of a harlot. Let the Christian, then, retain what so clearly belongs to him, and which appears appropriate and lovely only in his keeping.

Young gentlemen, as the future pastors of churches, and the representatives of the religious character of a section of the Christian community, I commend to you this large and comprehensive view of religion, which makes it embrace all that is excellent in practice, as well as all that is generous in sentiment and noble in character. Let it be seen, in your case, that religion is no abstract, unworking principle, severed from everything in life, and fit only for the cloister. Let religion be in you indeed, a fountain of living water, springing up unto everlasting life. Let it flow over and

flow out, irrigating all the heritage of God; and keeping the fountain full by constantly drawing upon the inexhaustible Fountain above, it will overflow continually. Thus filled and urged by the love of God, you will each of you realize in your lives, in a sense infinitely higher than was originally intended by it, the truth of that renowned saying of antiquity already alluded to, "I am a man, and therefore am interested in whatever is human." While you will not make so serious a mistake as to place the cure of particular evils above the cure of souls, you will yet feel an interest in whatever promises to improve the condition, or mitigate the sufferings of man. While your sympathies will stretch across oceans and continents, and embrace with special affection and unutterable yearnings the millions upon whom not even the first rays of the Gospel, nor scarcely of philanthropy, have ever fallen, you will not forget the suffering and the outcast at home. The poor will receive your sympathy and aid, the ignorant your instruction, the victims of intemperance and lust your admonitions and counsels, and the slave your earnest advocacy and prayers.

Place before yourselves for imitation the noblest specimens of whole-hearted and large-hearted Christianity which the history of the church presents;—a Howard, who, moved by Christian love, spent a whole life and a large estate in the most laborious and painstaking acts of benevolence; who, while he aroused all Europe by traversing its length and breadth that he might "dive into the depths of dungeons and plunge into the infection of hospitals," and thus bring to light their untold tales of woe, at home, in his little village of Cardington, gladdened the hearts of the peas-

antry by building for them cottages, establishing schools for their instruction, and mitigating their sorrows in all possible ways;—a Wilberforce who, while he pursued with an energy and a sagacity which command our admiration, that great measure of his life, and of modern times, the abolition of the slave trade, did not disdain to write books on practical religion, and even to keep his mind furnished with topics and trains of religious remark, so as to be able to mete out to each one a word in season;—a Judson who, though possessed of a natural delicacy and refinement of nature, and highly accomplished as a gentleman and a scholar, was yet, by the grace of God, enabled to relinquish kindred and home, and all the amenities of civilized life, and bury himself in the depths of Eastern jungles, amid the most degraded specimens of our race, that he might tell them of Christ, translate for them the Word of God, and in conjunction with others lay among them the foundations of a Christian civilization, which, with the blessing of heaven, shall one day light up the Orient with splendors above those of the midday sun!

But these and all other worthies fade away before the Great Master who is proposed to us as the highest object for our imitation. They do but say to us, in the language of the Apostle, “Be ye followers of me, as I am of Christ.” All human excellencies are but feeble reflections of his. The character of Christ, as presented in the Gospels, is the most attractive portraiture in the world’s history. With such a character, invested with such divine and saving power, well may he have said of himself, “And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me.” Christ lives in his

followers, and the history of the world is brightly illuminated along the line of his true disciples. The youth who early receives Christ as his Savior and Exemplar, and follows up by subsequent study the line of his influence in the world, moves among the noblest examples and the most inspiring influences presented in the history of the race. It is in the midst of such influences and examples that the fairest characters are formed. The church and the world are looking to the ranks of religious young men, who have enjoyed the advantages of high Christian culture, for the lights which are to enlighten the world. May they not look in vain!

BISHOP BUTLER

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PRELECTIONS ON BUTLER'S ANALOGY. By the late Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D. Works, Vol. ix. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.
A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY. Part II. By the Rev. Henry H. Duke, B.A. London: Joseph Masters. 1847.

THE last twenty-five years have witnessed a most striking and gratifying change in the popular appreciation of Butler as a moralist and Christian philosopher. His "Analogy," indeed, was never entirely destitute of marks of public favor, having passed through three editions during his lifetime, and a regular succession of editions afterward. But as a moralist he has, till of late, had but few followers. He formed no distinct school, but for generations stood almost alone—a giant in the midst of surrounding pygmies. Even Mackintosh could say of him, in his day, "There are few circumstances more remarkable than the small number of Butler's followers in ethics; and it is, perhaps, still more observable, that his opinions were not so much rejected as overlooked." This neglect he attributed to the difficulties of his style; but not, as it seems to us, with entire justice. Butler's style, it is true, does not possess all the graces of the most accomplished masters of the English language, but it is generally good, plain English, notwithstanding. His words are proper and his constructions correct and idio-

matic. Indeed, he is occasionally elegant, presenting passages here and there, not unworthy of the best writers.

Dr. Whewell,* with more justice, as we conceive, has ascribed the intricacies and difficulties of Butler, beyond what are necessarily involved in his matter, to his method of philosophizing — to his strict adherence to the simple generalization of facts, without committing himself to any particular theory for their explanation. He does not adopt a theory, and thus render its vocabulary of short, technical terms available to him in speaking of the various phenomena which are referred to it; but keeping aloof from all theories, and hence rejecting all technical terms, he is obliged at every turn to repeat a kind of definition or description of the thing intended. Such a method, while it gives rise to circumlocutions and repetitions in the presentation of his subjects, is the genuine method of the discoverer — it is precisely that of Bacon, and justly entitles him to the appellation which he has received, of “the Bacon of Theology.” His extreme cautiousness on this point, as well as an equal cautiousness, by proper limitations and sufficiently wide generalizations, to secure his principles from all objections and make them truly adequate to his subject, has given rise, as we conceive, to all, or nearly all in Butler’s writings, which can be complained of as unnecessarily perplexing or obscure. He is said to have remarked to a friend, that his plan in writing the “Analogy” had been “To endeavor to answer, as he went along, every possible objection that might occur to any one against any position of his, in his book.” And this seems to be the spirit in which he always wrote. The

* Hist. Mor. Philos. in England, Sec. viii.

very difficulties and obscurities of his style, then, are but the evidence and effect of the excellence of his method, and the breadth and completeness of his treatment.

Defensible, however, as are the obscurities of Butler's style, they have undoubtedly had no inconsiderable influence in retarding his progress to general appreciation and favor. But this tardy justice, we are persuaded, has been more owing to extraneous circumstances than to anything in the style of Butler. The central point of Butler's moral system is conscience, or a moral faculty, which, under the form of a moral sense, had been brought into disrepute, more especially by Shaftesbury. Conscience, to be sure, as treated by Butler, is distinct enough from the moral sense of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, but as being a distinct faculty was liable to be confounded with it, and to be regarded with the same suspicion. This prejudice would naturally tend to divert attention from his system, and keep the dominant systems of Clarke and Wollaston in the ascendant, till the utilitarian system, which from the time of Hobbes had enjoyed no inconsiderable share of the public favor, was molded into a more plausible and decorous form by Paley. This once accomplished, Butler was more and more lost sight of. From the undoubted merit of his other writings and the easy perspicuity with which he delivered his moral precepts, as well as from their dexterous adaptation to ordinary wants, Paley became at once the text-book at the universities, and the standard for moral reference in every-day life. Paley's ascendancy was thus complete, and remained almost unchallenged for a long series of years. At length, however, his defects began to be very generally felt, and in

looking around for a better master, all the soundest minds turned at once to Butler; so that now the reaction in his favor has become almost universal, both in this country and in England. The books at the head of this article are a portion of the fruit of this newly-revived zeal for Butler, and are placed there as evidence of this, rather than for distinct review. We shall simply make them a hook to hang a few general observations on, touching Butler and his works.

And, in the first place, it is remarkable how little these fresh investigations have added to the extremely scanty memorials of his life. They have corrected a few dates, added a few not very important facts, and discovered a few letters not before published, but have scarcely thrown a single additional ray of light upon his private habits and internal history. All inquiry upon this point, respecting which light is so much desiderated, seems to have been provokingly fruitless. We can hardly be reconciled to knowing so little of the intellectual habits of one whose mental experience must have been so rich and varied. We really begin to feel that modern biography, filled as it too often is with details *ad nauseam*, is not so great an evil, after all; for had it existed in the days of Butler, it might, as it does now, have chronicled the stupidities of many a dunce, but would, in all probability, have more than atoned for this, by giving us some adequate memorials of a life and character so intensely interesting and instructive. The magnificent intellectual products which he has left, indicating a mind of the greatest depth and candor, and the few glimpses which we get of his pure and amiable life, whet the curiosity to the keenest edge for more and more varied information in regard to him.

But oblivion has forever barred the access to such information. Living a bachelor all his days, and naturally of a timid, retiring, and even melancholy disposition, he held his chief converse with those profound and pregnant thoughts which give so solemn and venerable an air to his pages, and notwithstanding his high station, apparently came but little into contact with men. Such being the case, we must rest satisfied with the scanty memorials of his life which have been left us, grateful that we possess his works so complete, from which we may not only gain the choicest wisdom, but fill out with the most undoubting confidence the ideal of a character of the rarest excellence and beauty.*

The works of Butler have now been before the world considerably over a century, and it is remarkable how few of his principles have been invalidated by the experience and criticism of so long a period. The general result, indeed, as already observed, has been a growing conviction of the correctness of his principles, and appreciation of their importance. Assuming, as he does, the defense of virtue and piety, and throwing himself into the breach to arrest the progress of vice and infidelity, he stands exposed to the malignant attacks of all the enemies of righteousness; he presents a barrier to such, which they must demolish before they can advance any further. No wonder, then, that he has been closely scanned and violently assailed. Many an assailant has walked around the walls and scrutinized them narrowly, for some indefensible point at which he might scale them or open a breach, but generally without the

* There are three portraits of Butler known as originals, of which that taken at forty, by the celebrated Vanderbank, and published in Bartlett's Memoirs, is the most approved, and presents a striking combination of grace, benignity and intellect. *Bonum, virum facile crederes, magnum libenter.*

slightest success. We propose briefly to consider some of the objections which have thus been made to our author, and estimate their value.

These objections have been chiefly made against the "Analogy." No considerable objections have been urged against Butler's moral system. Mackintosh decides that there are no errors in this, though he thinks there are some defects — such as, that he neglects to assign any ground for the supremacy of conscience, or any objective rule for its action. These, we think, will hardly be regarded as valid objections at the present day. As to his having overlooked the evidence of the secondary character of self-love, which is another supposed defect referred to by this critic, we consider this rather the effect of his occasional and fragmentary method of treating morals, than as any real oversight. There can be no doubt that he fully understood and allowed the secondary character of this affection, and would have signalized it in a suitable manner in any full treatise on the subject; indeed, as it is, it is more than implied in several instances.* With the exception of the "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue," all Butler's moral treatises are in the form of sermons, admirably developing all the great principles, but without any pretense of covering and exhausting the whole subject. We should naturally expect some omission of details in such a mode of treatment. Indeed, this method, besides breaking the unity of his system, has undoubtedly damaged the reputation of Butler as a moralist in other respects. Sermons are not the most attractive species of literature to most readers, and are particularly unpromising as

* See especially his first sermon on the Law of our Neighbor.

the vehicle of a philosophical system. Undoubtedly this has had its full share in retarding his progress to that full and high appreciation as a moralist, which he deserves.

But the chief exceptions taken to Butler have been against his "Analogy," of which the first is this:— That the course of nature has been so altered by the fall as to leave no safe ground for an analogy between it and the system of grace. But the course of nature is still God's Providence, is still Divine Providence, and the world is God's world; and as long as this is the case, there must be just ground for an analogy between the systems of nature and grace. Whatever may have been the effects of the fall upon the course of nature, it is absurd to suppose them to be such as to make it a false or unsafe interpreter of the character and will of God. Indeed, natural religion is professedly founded upon nature as it is, and its teachings, as far as they go, are not at all at variance with those of revealed religion. At all events it is allowed that the effects of the fall are confined chiefly or solely to man and his relations, and hence do not touch the general framework of nature and course of Providence; and it is from these confessedly intact parts of nature that some of Butler's most weighty analogies for the special peculiarities of the remedial system are drawn.

Again, it has been objected to the "Analogy" that it only shifts the difficulty from revealed to natural religion, and thus puts weapons into the hands of the atheist for the overthrow of both. What is sustained by nature may, in a general sense, be said to be natural, and hence analogy may be regarded as bearing particularly upon natural religion. But whatever be the religious teachings of analogy drawn from

nature, they are of course null to an atheist, who not believing in God can not believe in religion. With him, therefore, the apparent disorders in nature are regarded as real, and used by him as an argument against the existence of God and religion. Now, supposing this to be the necessary deduction from Butler's argument by an atheist, the argument is still valid against the deist, and all other objectors, who must always constitute the great majority of unbelievers. But this is not the necessary nor even the natural effect of his argument upon the atheist. By considering these disorders as only apparent, as being parts of a scheme too vast and complicated for our feeble comprehension, he reconciles the mind to their consistency and justice, and thus wrests from the atheist the arguments which he draws from this source against God and natural religion, as well as those of deists against the Christian religion.

Again, it has been objected to the "Analogy" by Tholuck,* that it runs an analogy between the course of nature and the kingdom of grace, while it ought in consistency to be directly between the two kingdoms. This objection is rather technical than real. Indeed, it is almost founded upon a misrepresentation. Butler draws his analogies not only from the course, but from the constitution of nature. He takes nature in all its parts, as it exists, as a fact, and draws out the grand parallelism which exists between it and religion; he confronts the book of nature with the book of revelation through their whole extent. Nature is viewed as a kingdom just as much as grace is. They both have a constitution and a course—one just as much as the other, and may, therefore, be legitimately compared with each other in

* Quoted by Fitzgerald.

both these respects. But if Tholuck's meaning is, as perhaps it is, that both nature and religion are treated too much as facts, and too little as twin products of a common generating plan, then his objection resolves itself into a mere preference for a transcendental and speculative mode of treating the subject, instead of an accessible and practical one. Butler had too much good sound sense, and too much of the Baconian respect for facts, to attempt to go behind both nature and grace, and develop them from a common generating plan in the divine mind. The thing objected to, then, is what all sound practical thinkers will regard as his greatest excellence.

On the other hand, some particular arguments of the "Analogy" have, as we think, been assailed with success—particularly the argument for the oneness of the living agent, from the oneness of consciousness, and that for the existence of God, from our necessary conceptions of infinite space and time. But these arguments are not at all essential to his general conclusions, and indeed, are not his own, but Dr. Clarke's, reluctantly acquiesced in and adopted (as we learn from his early correspondence with that distinguished philosopher and divine), and not put forth with any prominence or much confidence. These two arguments, together with another from the chapter on the Moral Government of God (that in justification of our being created with a capacity for evil), are subjected to a most searching criticism in "Duke's Analysis." As to the objection of Chalmers, and other Scottish metaphysicians, against Butler's occasional use of analogy as a positive argument, this will be considered at a later stage of this article.

Having disposed of these objections to Butler's principles we are prepared to proceed to the principles themselves. His principles constitute what may be called a moral system and a religious system. The former is contained in his "Sermons at the Rolls" and the "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue," and the latter in the "Analogy." We propose briefly to illustrate the central principle of each system — Conscience and Analogical Reasoning.

There are three great classes of perceptions, or intuitions, which present themselves under a striking similarity of character, and have always been associated in men's thoughts and their expression of them — the perceptions of the Good, or Right, of the Beautiful and of the True. The True is conceived as embracing whatever is real in existence, whether material or logical, whether in fact or in thought; the Right, whatever is fitting in action to the relations subsisting among beings; the Beautiful, whatever in nature or in action is fitting in proportions, or mode, or attending circumstances. The faculty by which we apprehend Truth is Reason, that by which we apprehend Right is Conscience, and that by which we apprehend the Beautiful is Taste. They all, evidently, belong to the general principle of intelligence, since they are only so many forms of knowing, but are rightly distinguished as different faculties, since they each perform a different office, or apprehend things under different relations. A development of the similarities and differences between these powers and their objects will tend to fix the place of conscience, and establish its co-originality with the other two faculties.

In attempting to define the Right, the Beautiful, the True,

it was necessary to state vaguely, at least, what they are conceived to be; but strictly they are each incapable of definition. We may doubtless learn by experience something of the circumstances under which our faculties pronounce a thing true, or right, or beautiful, and thus make out a tolerable description of the conditions under which they decide, and may call this a definition; but this is only for our own convenience, and to meet the necessities of the case. Thus we say, reason pronounces that true which has a real existence, either in fact or conception; and that truth, therefore, is what is real. But this is a mere hypothesis. Whether what the reason receives as true is real, or only seemingly so, we can never determine. It seems real, doubtless; but this is only saying that it seems true. That is to say, the reason receives a thing as true simply because it recognizes it as true, and not because it knows its essential nature. So if we say the reason receives that as true which is presented to it in the legitimate use of the senses, of the memory, of the judgment, etc., this is only describing the circumstances under which it receives truth, not at all the criterion of it. Hence we come to the result that, as in all our original perceptions, truth is susceptible of no real definition, except an identical one; and all that we can say of it is, that truth is what is received as such by reason.

The same holds of the beautiful and the right. For the sake of convenience we describe them in a loose way, as consisting in a certain fitness or harmony of things. But whether there really be any such fitness in them or not, we can never positively determine. What we recognize as right or beautiful seems, each in its own sphere, to possess

a certain fitness; but we are confessedly not judges of the absolute fitness of things. The fitness referred to is simply a moral or æsthetic fitness, and is merely the conception which we have of the character of the right or the beautiful. Hence we do not recognize anything as right or beautiful because it is fit, but conceive it as fit in that it is right or beautiful. So if we attempt to define these perceptions by enumerating the conditions under which they arise, we are only stating the circumstances under which they emerge into consciousness, not describing their nature nor accounting for them. Here, then, as in the previous case, right can be defined only as that which is recognized as such by conscience, and the beautiful only as that which is recognized as such by the taste. The True, the Right and the Beautiful, therefore, represent original perceptions, and Reason, Conscience and Taste appear as original powers.

But let us attend to some real, or supposed, differences between the action of these powers. Conscience, it is said, is not simply a discerning, but an impelling, or a commanding and forbidding power. And are not the other powers so too, at least to some extent? The language of conscience is, "This is the way, walk ye in it"; and is the language of reason or taste anything less than this? Does not reason say, just as distinctly, if not as authoritatively, "This is the truth, conform ye to it"? and taste, "This is the beautiful, admire and imitate it"? And would not a man act just as absurdly who should discern the true or the beautiful, and pay no regard to it in his conduct, as the man "who knows his duty and does it not"? The man who, understanding the law of gravity, should throw himself from a precipice, or,

perceiving the beauty of graceful manners, should assume those of a clown, would be as inconsistent as he who, knowing the duty of honesty, refuses to pay his debts.

Still, it may be said, besides the apprehension of right and the impulse to it, various emotions or moral feelings, such as approbation, disapprobation, indignation, remorse, etc., are connected with the decisions of conscience, or rather, with the observance or violation of its rules. And are there not emotions, also, connected with the operation of the other powers? The emotions, in each department of our nature, seem very much dependent upon our general conceptions. It is plain that there could be no such thing as emotions if there were no notions of truth, duty, etc., since the very knowledge of all the particular things capable of producing emotion is comprehended in these. Even the discovery of abstract truth is attended with emotion, often the most intense, as witnessed in the *eureka* of Archimedes, and the particular objects which the passions go out after must first be apprehended intellectually before they can be enjoyed sensually. Indeed, while the desire for such objects cannot exist before they are perceived, in very many cases it springs up at once on their perception, and does so in all cases, after experience of their power to gratify. And as to the emotions connected with the beautiful, these confessedly spring up immediately in consequence of its perception. A man of taste sees everything as beautiful or deformed, and the perception always awakens with it corresponding emotions. The pleasures, and the vexations of taste, too, are familiar to all. It seems, then, that there still remains a general analogy between the three powers and

their concomitants. The moral feelings are but a natural appendage to the moral faculty, as the other classes of desires and emotions are to the other powers.

And yet there is a difference. It must be admitted, with Plato, that the passions are more especially the ministers of conscience. Conscience has to do with actions, and therefore needs their aid more than either of the other powers. As our eternal weal or woe, as well as our present happiness, depends upon our conduct, and as others are affected by it also, it is much more important that we should be made to follow the dictates of conscience, than those of either reason or taste. Besides, it has the Right to maintain among conflicting interests and principles of action, and hence has a more difficult part to perform. Accordingly we might expect that all the motives for obedience to conscience would be brought to bear upon us which can be thus brought consistently with freedom of choice. We are not forced to obey conscience, since this, by destroying our freedom, would destroy all virtue, and thus render the obedience worthless. But we are impelled to obedience by the most weighty motives; by a command sterner and more imperative than any other of which our nature is susceptible, by an approbation, a peace calmer and sweeter than any which earth affords, and by a fear of punishment more withering and a remorse more pungent and torturing than anything this side the world of woe. At the command of conscience, the passions, like so many avenging spirits, spring up to torture the contemner of its authority. Shame crimsions his face and guilt pierces his heart; Remorse rends his soul like an evil spirit; Fear haunts him by night and by day; In-

dignation and Revenge frown upon him from the faces of his fellows; dread Displeasure looks down upon him from above, and all the Avenging Passions pursue him as so many Furies. Thus it is that the passions are more especially the ministers of conscience. The commands of conscience are the most authoritative and the most powerfully enforced of any of our impulses. Our nature accords to them the highest place among the impulses to action, and pronounces all contravention of them by interfering passions, usurpation. And thus with our author we may truly say of conscience, that "had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."

Right, then, appears as a simple, original quality of actions, and conscience as an original power, presiding with authority over the moral relations of things, as reason does over their veritable relations, and taste over their æsthetic relations. But as laborious attempts have been made, and still are made, to reduce the idea of right to some more simple idea, and especially to that of utility, we shall devote a few paragraphs to the consideration of such a possibility.

The doctrine of utility as a principle of morals has received various forms, and has been variously applied by different speculators. In Hobbes, it is a bold and shameless resolution of all virtue into the lowest form of selfishness; in Shaftesbury, it becomes a more decorous and defined principle of self-love; while in Paley and Bentham it swells into that vague and ideal end, not only of all action, but of all existence, the principle of general utility, or the greatest good of the greatest number. But in all these forms there

is a common element; they all resolve virtue into happiness, and make right only another name for utility; while, at the same time, by assuming happiness, either public or private, as the great utility, they make happiness the grand end of life and the sole criterion of virtue. The question will be met, therefore, if it can be shown that the Moral Faculty sits in judgment upon the moral character of happiness, as it does upon other elements of conduct, and thus makes it but one of many considerations, which it embraces in its determinations of the morality of actions. This, therefore, we hasten to show.

It is admitted that one element of happiness, and a most important one, too, consists in self-approbation, and the approbation of others; not simply in the approbation of certain actions of ours, but in the approbation of ourselves, also, on account of these actions. We do not speak of the satisfaction or gratification which one feels when he has done merely a wise act, as when he has made a good bargain, or used his wits successfully in disentangling a complicated plot, but of a positive approbation of one's self as having done well, even when he has done nothing for himself, and has exerted no wisdom or prudence at all; as in plunging, without thought of self, into the water to rescue another from drowning, or any other act of pure benevolence. The utilitarian moralist delights to resolve all acts of benevolence into acts of selfishness, and would say that even such acts as the above are performed upon a refined calculation of the satisfaction and approval which he fore-saw would follow them. Let him do so, if he can take pleasure in thus stultifying himself for the sake of defaming

his kind; but it is plain that his explanation is wholly at variance with the facts in the case, and especially does not at all account for that peculiar self-approbation and public approbation which accompany such acts, on the special ground that they are generous, noble acts, and free from all taint of selfishness. Whence, then, comes this approbation? Why does he approve himself and others for such acts, while he disapproves those of an opposite character? Can any other answer be given to this question, than that he approves of some acts and disapproves of others, because he feels the former to be right and the latter to be wrong? The happiness of self-approbation and public approbation, then, depends upon the rightness of our actions, and not their rightness upon the happiness which they bring. For surely it would be reasoning in a vicious circle to say that the happiness connected with an action depends upon its rightness, and yet that its rightness depends upon its capacity of producing happiness.

As to other kinds of happiness, besides that which arises from the moral approbation of ourselves or others, some of it is simply innocent, and some of it is regarded as decidedly, and even heinously, wrong. Not simply the acts, we mean, but the happiness itself connected with the acts, is disapproved as wrong. This is the case with most selfish and sensual enjoyment, especially when it is at the expense of others—as the enjoyment of the drunkard, of the debauchee, etc. That is, happiness itself is approved or disapproved as right or wrong; how then can it be the source of the idea of right?

Again, it is right to promote the happiness of others and

wrong to injure them, or interfere with their happiness. But it is not, certainly, deemed right to promote all kinds of happiness in men. Some kinds of happiness in others appear immoral, as they do in ourselves, and such we cannot minister to and be innocent. Even genuine benevolence to others, as sacred a duty as it is in general, is limited, at least as far as the outward act is concerned, by higher duties, and becomes wrong when it goes beyond that limit. All which goes to show that happiness, instead of being the source of the idea of right, is itself judged of by the Moral Faculty, like other acts and states. That is, the idea of right and wrong is supreme and ultimate within this sphere, as within others.

The truth is, the coincidence of Right even with the Greatest Amount of Happiness, is a mere speculation, interesting enough, and perhaps probable in itself, if we regard the final issue of all things. But to say that the notion of right and wrong in the mind is determined in each case by a view of the utility of the act, in any sense, or that the consideration of consequences can be a sufficient rule of action to guide our lives, seems to us absurd. For how can the consequences be calculated; and especially, how can they be calculated with the rapidity which is necessary in the practical conduct of life?

We are thus brought to the central principle of Butler's Moral System, the independence and supremacy of Conscience among the different principles of action. This, we say, is really his central principle; and the supremacy of conscience is developed with masterly ability and distinctness, though its independence is rather assumed than estab-

lished, or even asserted with any steadiness or emphasis. At the time he wrote the terminology of morals was in great confusion, as well as its principles.* Not only were ethical writers divided as to whether there is any independent principle of morality, but as to the name which should be given it, admitting its existence. While, on the one hand, morality was referred to the Principle of Utility or the Will of God, as well as to a Moral Faculty, on the other, the Moral Faculty was variously denominated Right Reason, the Moral Sense, and Conscience, besides other occasional and periphrastic designations. In this unsettled state of things, Butler did not choose to commit himself in terms to any of the conflicting theories, but seems, rather, in some passages, anxious to conciliate them. But the whole structure and weight of his system is in favor of the existence of a moral faculty and an independent morality, although he does not describe it as such in set terms.

We now pass to Butler's Religious System. This is not so much a system of doctrines as a system of defenses of the commonly received doctrines of religion, both natural and revealed. It is entirely unique in character, and contained wholly in his treatise on the "Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature."

The single principle of defense employed in all parts of the treatise is that of analogy or likeness among things. The principle is evidently used with great moderation and fairness, and yet it may be well to fix its true nature and use somewhat more definitely than has been done by the author. In a passage in the introduction he declines, as for-

* See Whewell's "History of Moral Philosophy in England," Lecture VIII.

eign to his purpose, the instituting a systematic inquiry into the nature and uses of analogical reasoning, and devolves that duty upon the logicians. This duty has not been altogether neglected by that class of writers,* and accordingly its nature and limits are now as accurately determined as those of any other species of reasoning.

Analogical reasoning is a species of induction; or, more properly, is of the nature of induction—is an incomplete induction. In induction proper, two things agreeing in one or more properties are inferred to agree in a certain other property, which is shown to be invariably conjoined in one of the things with the property or properties which it has in common with the other; while in analogy it is only necessary that this third property should not be capable of being shown not to be connected in one thing with the qualities in which the two agree. Thus, in one case, the inference of further agreement is made with certainty, in the other, with only a certain measure of probability;—in the one the conclusion is that the third thing must follow, in the other that it may. And this probability must vary in different cases, from the lowest presumption, or a bare possibility, to the highest moral certainty. The inference of further agreement between the two things resting wholly upon their observed likeness in certain properties or circumstances, the probable truth of the inference must depend wholly upon the nature of the observed likeness. If the observed likeness be such that the inferred likeness would naturally, and almost unavoidably, flow from it, as where two things are observed to be alike in a fundamental property, and are in-

* See especially “Mill’s System of Logic,” book iii, chap. xx.

ferred to be alike in a property derived from this, or the reverse, the inference is made with the highest moral certainty; but where the observed likeness is only slight and unimportant, any further likeness is inferred with feeble probability. But every observed likeness is some warrant for inferring a further likeness, since things alike in anything are more likely to be alike in another thing, than those which have nothing in common. And, on the same principle, every dissimilarity is some warrant for inferring a further dissimilarity. Hence, the real strength of an analogical inference depends upon the extent and importance of the similarities between two things, compared with the extent and importance of their dissimilarities.

With this explanation of the nature of analogy, we are prepared to appreciate the application which has been made of it by our author. It is employed by him in defense of the doctrines and evidence of religion, chiefly against objections, but occasionally as a positive argument. The legitimacy of its use in repelling objections on this subject, no one can doubt; nor can any one doubt its triumphant success, who will patiently follow the author through the treatise. The case stands thus:— Religion, as an institution and a system of doctrines ordained of God, is objected to by men as unreasonable and inconsistent in many parts, and it is proposed to repel these objections by showing that the like objections may be made against nature and the present course of things, which are now allowed to be from God. It is asked how religion, which has so many objectionable features, can be from God, and it is answered, that these objectionable features are just as consistent with the idea of its

being from God, as the like features in nature are with its being from God. The two systems, then, the material and the spiritual, the present and the future, are shown to be alike in objectionable features, and they are inferred to be alike in their origin. The argument does not profess to prove that either of the systems is from God, but that one can not be denied to be from God, on account of objectionable features, unless the other be; and this it is fully competent to do, and does do, beyond the possibility of a reply. It is sufficient thus to have indicated the nature of the argument in its negative or defensive form; the ingenuity and thoroughness with which it is applied can be learned only by a perusal of the whole treatise.

As to the argument in its positive form it is but little used in any part of the work. It is capable, however, of being used thus, as is evident from the account which has been given of the nature of the principle of analogy. The most extended application of it in its positive form is to be found in the first chapter of Part First. There the object is not so much to repel objections against the doctrines of a future life by analogies from the present, as to render the fact of our existence beyond death probable. Hence the analogies from the transformations of plants and animals, and from the continuance of life in man through various mutilations, suspensions of the signs of life, and the wasting of disease up to the moment of death. These analogies certainly render it probable that the living agent will survive death. They do not simply remove opposite probabilities, as contended by Dr. Chalmers; they give a positive credibility to the doctrine. With some acknowledged imperfec-

tion in certain links of the argument no one can rise from a careful perusal of the chapter without feeling that the doctrine is something more than "not disproven," that it is, indeed, nearer to what is called "proven," though not, of course, established demonstratively and beyond all cavil. At all events, it is plain that analogy may have a positive force, and it seems to us that it has in this and many other parts of Bishop Butler's treatise.

But, after all, it is admitted that the great force of analogy, as applicable to the subject of religion, is defensive, and hence conservative in its effects. And it is precisely this which has given to the treatise of Bishop Butler, from the moment of its first appearance to the present time, its acknowledged pre-eminence among all the books which have been written in defense of religion. It confounds the cavalier, it checks the reckless speculator. Those upon whom the interests of morality and the other great interests of society rest are always conservative. From the nature of the case they always must be. Not that the truth and the right are always on the side of conservatism, but great interests must not be jeopardized by sudden changes; and especially things practically good must not be surrendered too hastily for what is asserted to be theoretically better. This is the universal cry of reckless speculators — they always profess to have discovered some better way a way more consonant with reason, and free from the inconsistencies and absurdities of that in practice. But the really responsible men in society are always chary of theories; their motto is, "Prove all things: hold fast that which is good." And in matters of religion they find no more powerful auxiliary in

doing this than Butler's "Analogy." It tends to prevent a reckless spirit of speculation on the subject, and throws up an impregnable rampart before the sterner doctrines of religion which are more likely to be objected against.

We know of no author who has shown so clearly the incapacity of man to speculate upon these high subjects. If the presumption and arrogant pretensions of man can ever be humbled, they must be before his wide-sweeping and far-reaching analogies. He bids the daring critic of the works and ways of God go on with his reveries, and fill out his amended system of things, and then in the simplest and quietest way possible shows him that he has no faculties for such speculations, and that his scheme is a mere series of imaginings, proposed as a substitute for the veritable facts of nature. He refers the hardy objector against the doctrines of religion to the like things in the providence and dealings of God here; and justifies the ways of God to man implied in religion, by an appeal to what he actually experiences in this life. To the supercilious caviler, confident in his shallow wisdom, he presents both the system of things with which we have come in contact, and that which is revealed to us, as but fragments of an infinitely larger scheme, and hence as little susceptible of rational criticism from us as the fragment of a demolished statue, or a few detached wheels and springs of a complicated machine.

It is a little remarkable, too, that in nothing has Butler been more successful than in his defense of the sterner doctrines of religion. Where religion is most liable to be objected against, there, precisely, is analogy the strongest. Nature is always serious, and often stern. It gives little

countenance to that mawkish sentimentality which would disrobe God of all his severer attributes, and subject him to the control of the single principle of sympathy or benevolence. And it is one of the greatest merits of the "Analogy" that it brings out in all its strength this confirmatory testimony of nature to the sterner aspects of the character of God and religion, as revealed in the Scriptures. Butler undoubtedly betrays, at times, some meagerness, and perhaps defectiveness, in his views of Christian doctrines, especially of the distinguishing doctrines of grace, but he saw too clearly the teachings of analogy to shrink from the doctrines of a controlling principle of righteousness in the character of God, and a state of punishment for the wicked in another world. The chapters which treat of these subjects are argued with great fullness and ability, and are among the most successful in the treatise.

Butler's "Analogy" has been a highly honored book. It has been more universally admired for its depth and thoroughness than any other book on the same, or perhaps any other subject. It has received the homage and acquiescence of the best minds in every age since its appearance. It has done more to shield religion from the ruthless attacks of its enemies, and drive back the Vandal hosts of infidelity from our altars — we had almost said — than all other books put together. Nor is its mission yet completed. It is as much needed now as ever, and as well adapted as ever to guard our faith, and will remain, we doubt not, to the end of time, one of the chief bulwarks of its defense.

DANIEL WEBSTER

AS A

STATESMAN AND AN ORATOR.

DANIEL WEBSTER AS A STATESMAN AND AN ORATOR.

THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, six volumes, 8vo. Boston : Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1851.

THE works of Daniel Webster form a legacy such as has rarely been left to the American people — a legacy peculiarly precious, because perfectly indigenous — all American, without the least foreign air or savor about it, and redolent in every part with the sweet hopes and memories of our native land, her institutions and laws. Nor am I surprised that our richest legacy should have fallen to us in this shape, and our greatest man have developed himself in this line. Dissociated both by our position and institutions from all the great nations of the earth, and without a venerable antiquity of our own to awaken the interest and ambition of the historian, or fill and garnish the imagination of the poet, while we are too practical and too much pressed with the wants of a young people to allow of a high degree of either metaphysical or æsthetic culture, there is still in our condition and institutions the most imperative demand for statesmanship and oratory.

As among the ancient Greeks, to be a statesman was considered merely as acting the part of a good citizen, so with us, every good citizen is expected to know something about politics, and to be prepared to bear an honorable and useful part in managing the state. We are a popular, constitu-

tional government, consisting of about thirty affiliated states, bound together in a national Union by a general government of limited powers, and sustaining complicated and delicate relations to the integral units composing the Union. Ours is strictly a government of law, and not of force; everything is adjusted by law, and all public, and most private, questions are settled, and can be settled, only by legal discussions. Where military rule exists, the sword settles all questions; there is no need of talk — the less talk the better; there is not even a word with the blow, but the blow is dealt in silence, and the work all the more effectually done. So, too, in great measure, in all arbitrary governments. When a ruler can say, "I am the state," why should he allow his subjects to discuss matters? And when less arbitrary than this, he still allows the privilege to but few, and to these only in a given line. Despotism is simple, but constitutional government necessarily embraces a complicated system of laws, forms and precedents. And when we add to this that our government is not only legal, but popular — that it is created and administered by an agency periodically appointed by the people, we see what a field it opens for the display of popular eloquence. In our courts of justice the speaker finds his eloquence demanded and aided by the presence of a jury; in the legislative hall, by interesting questions, conflicting views, and able opponents; while at our political elections he is stimulated almost to madness by the dense crowds of upturned faces which surround him.

With its complicated and nicely adjusted system of laws, its popular courts, popular legislatures and popular elections, no country in the world ever presented such a field

for eloquence as ours, and hence is the natural mother of such a son as Daniel Webster. Mr. Webster was pre-eminently a statesman and an orator. Statesmanship was the great business of his life, the grand resultant of all his intellectual activity, to which his profound legal and other attainments were only subservient. Excluding, therefore, other views which might be taken of his character, I purpose, in this paper, to offer a few observations upon the character of Daniel Webster as a Statesman and an Orator.

And at the outset we are struck with the perfection in which he combines in himself this double character. Mr. Webster's oratory was always statesmanlike, and his statesmanship always dignified, and adorned with oratory. His oratory was almost always employed upon great state-questions. No orator of his times devoted his eloquence so exclusively to the state. Most of his celebrated legal arguments hinge upon constitutional questions, and even his political speeches have little that is trivial or merely partisan in them, but treat of great national questions, usually in a cool, dispassionate way. I shall not, then, attempt to discriminate these two characters in him, nor care to inquire very closely, in each case, whether my illustrations apply to him in the one or the other character—I shall rather, practically, consider the two characters as one.

The first thing which strikes one in the speeches of Mr. Webster is the great dignity and importance of the matter. The greatness and dignity of his mind are reflected in nearly all his speeches. His mind scorned and rejected a mean, or low, or trivial subject, as a sound stomach does poison. But whatever it received, though in itself of but

common importance, it raised, by its own encircling majesty, to the dignity of uncommon things. I doubt if another case can be pointed to, of an orator, having occasion to speak on so many and widely-differing occasions, through the period of a long life, and often under strong temptations to cater to a low and depraved taste, who so uniformly selected important topics, and treated them in so manly and dignified a style.

But above this, his great efforts were all on great subjects. There is no factitious greatness about his speeches; they are merely full, lucid, able and ample discussions of subjects in themselves great. Their greatness consists in being equal to their great subjects — in being adequate and appropriate exhibitions of matters of which most minds have but faint and meager conceptions. There is rhetoric in them, doubtless, but only such as the subject demands, and the absence of which would be a fault rather than a virtue; it furnishes the fit relief and adornment to subjects of so vast and grand proportions. Open his works, and carefully turning over the leaves, observe, as you advance, the subjects and manner of his discourse. Commencing with those splendid and elaborate discourses on the early history, worthies and monuments of our country, you fall in succession upon his many speeches on our manufactures, our commerce, our currency, our religion, our laws, our Constitution and our Union. When did an orator have such materials to select from? and when select so nobly? You will find no such list of subjects in the synoptical table of the speeches of any other orator, living or dead.

Indeed, in perusing these speeches, one is conscious of an

involuntary feeling of gratitude, that all these grand questions arose in Mr. Webster's day, and have been discussed by him for all coming time. For myself I confess to a very strong feeling of that kind. In his "Patriotic Speeches," as they have been called, such as deal with the early history and worthies of our country, how vast the service which he has done for the American people and for mankind! These speeches forever rescue from oblivion, and invest with a high and glorious immortality the privations, the sufferings and the daring of our noble ancestors. They give a voice, and an all-potent one, too, to the early events of our history, which, without them, for aught that could have been accomplished by ordinary minds, must have remained comparatively dumb and silent. Articulated by such a voice, and dignified and adorned by such an eloquence, they are safely consigned to the keeping of the great heart of humanity, which will never fail to cherish and imitate them.

And to say nothing of the other great subjects which engaged his eloquence, who does not rejoice that Daniel Webster lived to discuss, in all its forms, and under almost every conceivable aspect, the nature, value and means of preserving our glorious Constitution and equally glorious Union? Notwithstanding the censure which some parts of his course on this subject have drawn upon him, and perhaps with some justice, his services as an advocate and defender of our Constitution and Union, are undoubtedly pre-eminent above those of any other man, and the American people will always owe to him a debt of gratitude, which they can never (were they better disposed to than we fear they

now are) fully discharge. He early saw and felt the vast importance of the Union to the people of these states; he early studied, and never through life ceased to study, its nature and powers, and furnished himself with facts and arguments for its elucidation and defense. So that, while we find in all his speeches, from the very first to the very last, the expression of some timely hope, or fear, or appreciating sentiment about this much-cherished union — forming together a coronet of gems of which any brow might be proud — there were occasions when the whole majesty and intensity of his great soul were poured out upon this subject in a torrent of scathing argument and burning eloquence, which nothing could resist.

A truly great mind, in the course of a lifetime, usually meets with some fitting occasion for the display of its highest powers. Such an occasion for Mr. Webster arose when the monster Nullification reared its hideous form in the Senate of the nation, and threatened to rend the Union asunder. Creeping stealthily for a time among the marshes of morbid, sectional feeling, and growing by what it fed on, it at length thrust its head into the halls of the national legislature, in the debate on Foote's resolution, and was afterward charmed in, and exhibited at full length, in the famous Resolves of Mr. Calhoun. The crisis had come, and who should meet it? There was but a single man there equal to the task, and that man was Daniel Webster. There were many true and faithful men there, who would vote right on the question, many who would make a respectable argument against the doctrine in debate, but only one who could meet and settle it forever — only one, who, from his courage, his

transcendent abilities, his readiness in debate, and complete mastery of the subject, could gather his armor hastily about him, and take the field at a moment's warning. All eyes were turned to him, nor did he disappoint the public expectation.

The two speeches of Mr. Webster on this subject, in the Senate of the United States, the first, in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the debate on Foote's resolution, and the second, in reply to Mr. Calhoun, on the Force Bill, not only met the crisis externally, but actually; yes, triumphantly, gloriously. The mind that follows him through those speeches is not only exhilarated and delighted as it passes along, but when it reaches the close, shuts the book with a concussion, from an impulse of spasmodic joy, and lays it down with an intensity of conviction, and an absorbing, bewildering sense of admiration, which overwhelm, and almost benumb its powers. There is a fitness, a fullness, a brilliancy, a cogency, in those speeches, which take the mind captive. There are passages in them, before which the mind actually stands in awe. As, for instance, in the reply to Mr. Hayne, where, in the midst of a most terrific torrent of sarcasm, which the nerves are scarcely able to bear, by referring to what might be the effect upon him of a certain degree of provocation, and thus implying that he was then speaking with comparative coolness and tameness, he flashes a gleam of light upon a depth of wrathful indignation and scornful ire, before which one actually trembles:—

Sir, I shall not allow myself, on this occasion, I hope on no occasion, to be betrayed into any loss of temper; but if provoked, as I trust I never shall be, into crimination and recrimination, the honorable member may

perhaps find that, in that contest, there will be blows to take as well as blows to give ; that others can state comparisons, as significant, at least, as his own, and that his impunity may possibly demand of him whatever powers of talent and sarcasm he may possess. I commend him to a prudent husbandry of his resources.

Of all Mr. Webster's speeches, the two on this subject are undoubtedly his greatest. And of these, while that in reply to Hayne has the greatest personal interest and point, and excites the highest degree of admiration, that in reply to Calhoun is perhaps the most compactly argued, and exhibits the greatest solidity of talent. Mr. Webster always rises with the occasion. The greater the crisis, the greater his courage ; the higher the theme, the loftier his flight. Indeed, he seems much more at home on great questions than on small ones, and meets them far more adequately. A lofty region is far better suited to the constitution of his mind. He feels more in his native element in these upper regions, and moves more gracefully and easily. Being constitutionally of a somewhat lethargic temperament and heavy mold, he was aroused only by great subjects, and on small ones often made still smaller efforts. Hence it is that all his great speeches are on great subjects — great either in themselves, in their associations, or in their bearings. And this, more than anything else, shows the greatness of his mind.

Another marked characteristic of Mr. Webster's oratory is found in the general tone of his speeches. That this tone would always be elevated might be inferred from what has already been said. But beyond this there are certain interesting features or variations in the general tone, which deserve special attention.

And, in the first place, Mr. Webster's speeches are strongly characterized by a patriotic tone. Indeed, there are certain of his speeches, and these among his most celebrated, which are so filled and pervaded by this spirit as to have received the designation of "Patriotic Speeches"; such as his Plymouth discourse, his Bunker Hill speeches, and his eulogies on Adams and Jefferson, Washington, etc. In these he goes back to do honor to our self-denying and heroic ancestry, and the illustrious band of patriots who achieved our independence — to rekindle his own patriotism, and that of the nation, at the altars of our early martyrs and heroes. And as we follow him in those splendid discourses, now depicting the sufferings and sacrifices of the early settlers on these inhospitable shores, of "chilled and shivering childhood, houseless, but for a mother's arms, couchless, but for a mother's breast," now summoning from their tombs the shades of our illustrious heroes, and embalming their memory with a nation's tears, and now raising his eyes to the future, and saluting the rising generations as they come, bidding them welcome to this pleasant land of their fathers, we find ourselves rapt up to something the same height of patriotic enthusiasm as the speaker, and are ready with him to approach the tomb of Warren, and pour out our lamentations in that touching apostrophe to the departed hero, which in tenderness and pathos is scarcely equalled by the happiest inspiration of the Tragic Muse:—

But ah! Him! the first great martyr in this great cause! Him! the premature victim of his own self-devoting heart! Him! the head of our civil councils, and the destined leader of our military bands, whom nothing brought hither but the unquenchable fire of his own spirit! Him! cut off by Providence in the hour of overwhelming anxiety and thick gloom;

falling ere he saw the star of his country rise ; pouring out his generous blood like water, before he knew whether it would fertilize a land of freedom or of bondage ! — how shall I struggle with the emotions that stifle the utterance of thy name ! Our poor work may perish, but thine shall endure ! This monument may molder away ; the ground it rests upon may sink down to a level with the sea ; but thy memory shall not fail ! Where-soever among men a heart shall be found that beats to the transports of patriotism and liberty, its aspirations shall be to claim kindred with thy spirit !

And not only in these speeches devoted to patriotic recollections, but in all his speeches, his patriotism shines forth conspicuously. There is everywhere, both in his words and deeds, unmistakable evidence of an intelligent and genuine patriotism ; he allowed no occasion of evincing it, either in act or in speech, to pass unimproved.

Indeed, there was a wholesome national feeling in Mr. Webster, which we should like to see more universally exhibited by public men. There was no foreign air or savor about him. As he said of Washington, his character is wholly an American product. He sprung from a sound republican stock, and he proved himself worthy of his parentage. His education, his way of thinking and feeling, and all his tastes and habits, were American. Not that he had a contempt for what is not American, or participated in the vulgar prejudices against foreign nations, or overestimated our relative position in the scale of nations. While he was enlightened and fair-minded with regard to other nations, he was equally enlightened and fair-minded with regard to his own. He had neither the partiality which blinded him to the faults of his country, nor the foreign learning which made him exaggerate her faults, or magnify

the advantages of other countries at her expense. Mr. Webster carried this feeling with him into his business as a statesman, and, like all sound, practical statesmen, uniformly acted upon that profound principle announced to the Athenians by Demosthenes, more than two thousand years ago, "That the prosperity of their state would be best promoted by following domestic, not foreign, examples." In the like spirit Mr. Webster says, in his speech on General Jackson's Protest, "Our American questions must be discussed, reasoned on, decided and settled, on the appropriate principles of our own constitutions, and not by inapplicable precedents and loose analogies drawn from foreign states." And this accurately exhibits his general spirit as a statesman.

Mr. Webster was national, also, in another sense of that word. That is, he was not a sectional man, but embraced the whole Union in his views and desires. If any man could set up a claim of loving the Union more than others, Mr. Webster was that man; for he said and did more for it than any, and we had almost said, every man of his age. And notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, I will not yet believe that regard for the Union had nothing to do with his speech on the Compromise Measures, which has been so much complained of. How stood the case with us at that time? The Union was not, perhaps, immediately in danger. Mr. Webster, as far as we have been able to ascertain, nowhere says that he thought so; but that sectional and party feeling had become so excited and exasperated on the questions arising out of the acquisition of new territory, and kindred questions, that unless soothed and tranquilized by certain compromises it would inevitably

lead to disunion. And considering the nature of the questions agitated, and the inducements and facilities for forming a southern republic (an idea not wholly abandoned, it is evident, even now), we confess that we do not greatly disagree with Mr. Webster on this point. At least, considering all the circumstances in the case, and the fact that many other great and good men thought the Union in danger, it is but fair to consider that Mr. Webster thought so too. And if he did, we put it to any candid, fair-minded man, if he did not, in the main, act rightly in the premises. The statesman cannot control Providence, he does not make events, but takes them as they are, and makes the best of them. His business is practical, and as long as evil exists in the world it must often be a choice between evils. If there was, at the time referred to, on the one hand the danger of disunion, and on the other the danger of strengthening the slave-power, here, plainly, were two evils to choose between; which of the two should a wise statesman have chosen? Great as is the curse of slavery, frightful as is the array of evils following in its train, will any one, looking at the interests of humanity as a whole, or even to those of the slave, in the end allow, I do not say the original introduction of this curse, but a temporary augmentation of its power, to overbalance in his mind the evils which would flow from the sundering of these states? Blasted and purblind must be the sight which could see things thus. Where would the slave be in that case? Helpless and hopeless in the hands of his taskmaster, and subject at any moment to be marched off to Mexico or Cuba, or the Lord knows where, to meet the demands of an aggressive and

expanding slave republic. And if it be added to this, that the slave-power has not yet been at all strengthened, as far as any actual extension of slavery is concerned, by the passage of the Compromise Measures, and probably never will be, as Mr. Webster strenuously maintained would be the result, who will undertake to condemn the statesman for his course? or, rather, who will fail to honor him for it? There are some things in that speech, as well as in the speeches on the same subject, which he delivered in various parts of the country, immediately after that, that I could wish were different, but with his general course on this question, under the circumstances, I cannot find it in my heart to complain.

Another feature in the pervading tone of Mr. Webster's speeches is a sound and intelligent love of liberty. We see this in his love and admiration for its defenders and martyrs, both in our own and in other lands. It burns in every line of his Patriotic Speeches; it adds warmth and grace to his speeches on Greece and the Panama Mission; it comes out in his efforts for the Hungarian exiles, and shines forth conspicuously in all his acts and sayings during the whole course of his life. Witness its outbursts in his indignant rebukes of the maligners of the South American Republics, in his speech on the Panama Mission:—

We are told that the country is deluded and deceived by cabalistic words. Cabalistic words! If we express an emotion of pleasure at the results of this great action of the spirit of political liberty; if we rejoice at the birth of new republican nations, and express our joy by the common terms of regard and sympathy; if we feel and signify high gratification that, throughout this whole continent, men are now likely to be blessed by free and popular institutions; and if, in the uttering of these sentiments, we happen to speak of sister republics, of the great American

family of nations, or of the political system and forms of government of this hemisphere, then, indeed, it seems, we deal in senseless jargon, or impose on the judgment and feeling of the community by cabalistic words! Sir, what is meant by this? Is it intended that the people of the United States ought to be totally indifferent to the fortunes of these new neighbors? Is no change in the lights in which we are to view them to be wrought by their having thrown off foreign dominion, established independence, and instituted on our very borders republican governments essentially like our own? If it be a weakness to feel a strong interest in the success of these great revolutions, I confess myself guilty of that weakness. If it be weak to feel that I am an American, to think that recent events have not only opened new modes of intercourse, but have created also new grounds of regard and sympathy between ourselves and our neighbors; if it be weak to feel that the South, in her present state, is somewhat more emphatically a part of America than when she lay obscure, oppressed and unknown, under the grinding bondage of a foreign power; if it be weak to rejoice when, even in any corner of the earth, human beings are able to rise from beneath oppression, to erect themselves, and to enjoy the proper happiness of their intelligent nature — if this be weak, it is a weakness from which I claim no exemption.

But, it has been objected, Mr. Webster was in favor of founding government on property, and always advocated that view of the constitution which gave the largest powers to the general government, and these views are not favorable to the largest liberty. As to this founding of government on property, of which so much has been said by his enemies, let us see what it amounts to. We are not aware that Mr. Webster refers to this subject but twice, in any of his speeches or writings. He refers to it in his speech on the Basis of the Senate, in the convention to amend the constitution of Massachusetts, and in his Plymouth discourse.

In the first case he contends that, since the representa-

tion in the House was based upon polls, it would be wise and proper, for the purpose of giving it a somewhat different constituency, and thus making it a more effectual check on the other branch, to base the representation in the Senate on the aggregate of property; so that, while the one body represented the individuals of the state, the other should represent the property of the state. This, it will be perceived, is a very different thing from proposing that only men of property should be admitted to full citizenship, and made eligible to office, which is the common impression that has been given of his views on this subject. And considering that a free government must always be one of checks and balances, we see not why such an arrangement would not be quite as wise and as consistent with general liberty, too, as that actually adopted.

Where Mr. Webster alludes to this subject in his Plymouth discourse, he is speaking of the bearing of the laws for the descent and transmission of property upon the freedom of a government, and of the fortunate arrangement and happy effect of the laws on this subject in our own country. Having discussed the bearings of the division of property upon government, and shown that free governments can exist only where property is free in its transmission and alienation, he makes this general remark, as a sort of maxim for legislators, and a test of political wisdom under all circumstances:—"It would seem, then, to be the part of political wisdom to found government on property; and to establish such distribution of property, by the laws which regulate its transmission and alienation, as to interest the great majority of society in the support of the government."

That this is a general remark, and not a rule by which he supposed our government might be advantageously reformed, is evident not only from all that precedes it, but also from what immediately follows it. He goes on to say: "This is, I imagine, the true theory and actual practice of our republican institutions. With property divided as we have it, no other government than that of a republic could be maintained, even were we foolish enough to desire it." The founders of our government, then, had established the requisite laws on property for maintaining, and even rendering necessary, the form of government which they set up, and hence were wise legislators, according to his maxim. The laws of property which they established are so free, and property in consequence is so widely diffused, that, in the general sense in which he used the term, our government actually is founded on property.

As to Mr. Webster's view of the powers of the general government of the Union, it is not true that he advocated the largest construction for them. He simply contended that it should have, and ought to use, all that belonged to it—neither more nor less. Doubtless he claimed for it more than Nullification allowed it, but then it should be remembered, he with equal vehemence denied it what General Jackson and some others have claimed for it. He claimed for it, to be sure, the power of creating a national bank, of laying a protective tariff, and carrying on internal improvements. But it was only because he thought these powers belonged to it, and ought not to be relinquished. He drew these powers both from an obvious construction of the constitution itself, and from the history of its formation and

early operation. And I must say that I have never seen his arguments, on most of these points, fairly refuted. Whether it may be wise or not for the general government to exercise these powers is another question, but that they are fairly within its scope, we think Mr. Webster and others have clearly shown. It was the great effort of Mr. Webster's life to maintain the constitution and laws of the country in their original integrity, and if this be a fault, it is one in which he had good reason to glory.

Again, Mr. Webster's speeches exhibit a striking moral tone. Perhaps no eyes, save those of envy and slander, ever detected anything beyond venial faults in the life and conduct of Mr. Webster; but however this may be, there can be no doubt of the high moral tone of his writings. Like all great orators, he everywhere recognizes and does due homage to the principles of virtue and religion. He is another illustration of the truth, that every truly great orator must have in lively exercise, at least the instincts of virtue. Nothing but this will carry him to the height of a great argument. Nothing but this will attract him to those store-houses of truth and fields of illustration, which contain the materials for investing his theme with a commanding interest and dignity. Nothing but this will enable him to command, at the same time, the hearts and the heads of men, and thus carry with him their highest and warmest convictions. Mr. Webster undoubtedly had these instincts in a very high degree and in very lively exercise. He had a sound moral training in his youth, was through life a frequent reader of the Holy Scriptures, and, as many who best knew him believe, a devout Christian. His moral culture was certainly

remarkable, and produced the most striking effects upon his eloquence. How often he surprises and delights us by a happy Scriptural allusion or quotation! and how often he ennobles his argument by investing it with the sanctions of morality and religion, of God and of goodness! In the only direct personal collision which he ever had with Mr. Calhoun, in which the latter had thrown out certain vague, undefined charges against him, he gives a terrible energy and point to his retort, by adding to it the weight of Scripture authority:—

I think we read, sir, that one of the good spirits would not bring against the arch-enemy of mankind a railing accusation; and what is railing but general reproach, an imputation without fact, time, or circumstance?

While all his speeches are sprinkled over with these moral touches and allusions, there are several which are remarkable for their moral and religious tone, especially his Eulogy on Jeremiah Mason, and his speeches in the Girard will case, and the trial of the Knapps. In the first of these there is a passage of great solemnity and interest, which would do honor to the heart of the devoutest Christian. As it expresses more directly and fully, perhaps, than any passage in his works, his own solemn convictions on the subject of personal religion, it may well be quoted here:—

But, sir, political eminence and professional fame fade away and die with all things earthly. Nothing of character is really permanent but virtue and personal worth. These remain. Whatever of excellency is wrought into the soul itself belongs to both worlds. Real goodness does not attach itself merely to this life; it points to another world. Political or professional reputation cannot last forever; but a conscience void of offense before God and man is an inheritance for eternity. Religion, therefore, is a necessary and indispensable element in every great human

character. There is no living without it. Religion is the tie that connects man with his Creator, and holds him to his throne. If that tie be all sundered, all broken, he floats away a worthless atom in the universe ; its proper attractions all gone, its destiny thwarted, and its whole future nothing but darkness, desolation and death. A man with no sense of religious duty is he whom the Scriptures describe, in such terse but terrific language, as living "without God in the world." Such a man is out of his proper being, out of the circle of all his duties, out of the circle of all his happiness, and away, far, far away, from the purposes of his creation.

The speech in the Girard will case was entitled by its author, in the pamphlet edition published at the time, "The Christian Ministry and the Religious Education of the Young." It is an argument for placing education upon a Christian basis, and the importance and necessity of the Christian ministry in a Christian scheme of education. As Mr. Girard had expressly excluded all Christian ministers, not only from all part in the management, but even from entering on the premises, of the orphan school, to be founded according to his will in the city of Philadelphia, Mr. Webster took the ground before the court that a bequest made under such conditions was not, in the eye of the law of a Christian country, properly a charity, and therefore not entitled to the ordinary legal protection which charities enjoy against the claim of the heirs at law. It is the noblest argument on this subject, and the noblest tribute to the value of Christian institutions, that any statesman of our country, or, perhaps, of any country, has left. It excited the greatest interest at the time, and called forth not only the admiration and commendation of individuals all over the country, but even of some religious bodies. The subject is wholly religious in its bearings, and is treated throughout in the most impressive and solemn tone.

It is on the general doctrine of Mr. Girard's will that the minds of the young should not be preoccupied or prejudiced, as it is usually termed, by religious instruction, but should be left blank on this subject till they arrive at maturity, that they may form their religious views for themselves — a doctrine still held by many mistaken people. I wish all such would read Mr. Webster's whole speech on this and kindred topics. I quote only the following passage:—

Why, sir, it is vain to talk about the destructive tendency of such a system; to argue upon it is to insult the understanding of every man; it is mere, sheer, low, ribald, vulgar deism and infidelity! It opposes all that is in heaven, and all on earth that is worth being on earth. It destroys the connecting link between the creature and the Creator; it opposes that great system of universal benevolence and goodness that binds man to his Maker. No religion till he is eighteen! What would be the condition of all our families, of all our children, if religious fathers and religious mothers were to teach their sons and daughters no religious tenets till they were eighteen? What would become of their morals, their character, their purity of heart and life, their hope for time and eternity? What would become of all those thousand ties of sweetness, benevolence, love and Christian feeling, that now render our young men and young maidens like comely plants growing up by a streamlet's side? the graces and the grace of opening manhood, of blossoming womanhood? What would become of all that now renders the social circle lovely and beloved? What would become of society itself? How could it exist? And is that to be considered a charity which strikes at the root of all this; which subverts all the excellence and the charms of social life; which tends to destroy the very foundation and framework of society, both in its practices and opinions; which subverts the whole decency, the whole morality, as well as the whole Christianity and government of society? No, sir! no, sir!

The speech in the trial of the Knapps is one of great ingenuity and power, and is pervaded in all parts by a high moral tone. There is one passage in it, on the power of

conscience, of so marked a character as to arrest the attention of every reader, and which I venture to transfer to my pages, at the risk of repeating what is already familiar: —

Ah! gentlemen, that was a dreadful mistake. Such a secret can be safe nowhere. The whole creation of God has neither nook nor corner where the guilty can bestow it, and say it is safe. Not to speak of that eye which pierces through all disguises, and beholds everything as in the splendor of noon, such secrets of guilt are never safe from detection, even by men. True it is, generally speaking, that "murder will out." True it is, that Providence hath so ordained, and doth so govern things, that those who break the great law of heaven by shedding man's blood, seldom succeed in avoiding discovery. Especially, in a case exciting so much attention as this, discovery must come, and will come, sooner or later. A thousand eyes turn at once to explore every man, every thing, every circumstance, connected with the time and place; a thousand ears catch every whisper; a thousand excited minds intensely dwell on the scene, shedding all their light, and ready to kindle the slightest circumstance into a blaze of discovery. Meantime the guilty soul cannot keep its own secret. It is false to itself; or rather it feels an irresistible impulse of conscience to be true to itself. It labors under its guilty possession, and knows not what to do with it. The human heart was not made for the residence of such an inhabitant. It finds itself preyed on by a torment, which it dares not acknowledge to God or man. A vulture is devouring it, and it can ask no sympathy or assistance either from heaven or earth. The secret which the murderer possesses soon comes to possess him, and leads him whithersoever it will. He feels it beating at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding disclosure. He thinks the whole world sees it in his face, reads it in his eyes, and almost hears its workings in the very silence of his thoughts. It has become his master; it betrays his discretion; it breaks down his courage; it conquers his prudence. When suspicions from without begin to embarrass him, and the net of circumstances to entangle him, the fatal secret struggles with still greater violence to burst forth. It must be confessed, it will be confessed; there is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession.

But there is another sense in which Mr. Webster's speeches exhibit a remarkable moral tone—they breathe throughout what might be called a high constitutional morality. We freely admit the right of a people to revolution. We as freely admit the right of an individual to disobey the law for conscience' sake, he acknowledging his civil liability for the violation, and manfully taking the consequences. For genuine conscience is no sneak. The great martyrs to civil and religious liberty never won their title to the crown of martyrdom by sneaking, but while they openly proclaimed the injustice of the law, they vindicated their sincerity, and gave weight to their testimony, by calmly and meekly yielding themselves up to suffer the penalty. When they placed their consciences above the law, they placed them, also, above racks, and tortures, and death itself. There is doubtless such a thing as a "higher law." But a higher law which deserves the name must be calm, self-reliant and manly. When a case of conscience actually arises, when the "higher law" plainly demands your obedience, follow it; but in all cases which fall short of this, obedience to the established laws of the land is the plain dictate of morality; nay, it is a high and sacred duty, which in a free government, like ours, rises almost to the character of a cardinal virtue. It is by the prevailing sense of this obligation among the people of this country that we have been preserved thus far, and enjoy the happiness and prosperity by which we are surrounded.

If we need illustrations to teach us the importance of this principle, we have them, and very impressive ones, too, in the history of other nations. Within the past year we have

seen the only considerable republic on the continent of Europe go down under the clutch of a tyrant, for the want of this very feeling. Had there existed a tithe of the constitutional morality in France which exists in this country, Louis Napoleon might have been the president of France, but never could have become its emperor. In his proclamation to the people, on his first strike, the prince-president gravely said to them that he had "left the law to return to right"; which, I suppose, he thought a very pretty saying, a genuine *bon mot*. But how would such a saying sound from the president of these United States? "Left the law to return to right"! What utter confusion of ideas! Was not the right in the law? and if it was not, who authorized him to go in search of it elsewhere? The republic was legally established, and rightfully could be abolished only by law. This single sentence, so confidently put forth, and so readily received by the nation, reveals the whole ground of the downfall of the French republic. There was no sound constitutional morality either in the people or their chiefs. So, too, with the Mexican and South American republics. These republics are mostly modeled after our own, and have been in existence about half the period of our Union. But how different their history! It presents little else than a succession, in each state, of plots and revolutions, conducted by rival chieftains, each endeavoring to supplant the other, and gain possession of the chief power, not by the free votes of the people, but by the sword. It is hoped that some of them are improving a little of late, but they still exhibit a great want of that practical regard for law which has been the fruitful cause of much of their calamitous history.

But with us, by the favor of Providence, a sound constitutional morality has become so thoroughly established (and may it never become unsettled) that law and majorities, the two great principles of our government, are acquiesced in without the least show of resistance, or even a murmur. When the voice of the majority is fairly pronounced, the most extensive party organizations and the intensest party excitement collapse and subside, like a tempest which has spent its force. Nor is it necessary that the majority should be large in order to command a quiet acquiescence. There are constantly occurring among us instances of elections, and that, too, to the highest offices, carried by a single vote, where the successful candidate takes his seat as quietly as though elected by a majority of thousands. This virtue, undoubtedly, we inherited largely from our English ancestry, but it needs constant and assiduous cultivation, and it will ever be one of the chief elements in the fair fame of Mr. Webster, that he so studiously, perseveringly and effectually inculcated and enforced it, through the whole course of his life. The words of Senator Seward, recently uttered in the senate of the nation, referring to Mr. Webster's decease, so happily express the great service which Mr. Webster rendered the country in this regard, that I venture to quote them here: —

The first revolutionary assembly that convened in Boston promulgated the principle of the revolution of 1688 — “Resistance to unjust laws is obedience to God” — and it became the watchword throughout the colonies. Under that motto the colonies dismembered the British Empire and erected the American Republic. At an early day it seemed to Daniel Webster that the habitual cherishing of that principle, after its great work had been consummated, threatened to subvert, in its turn, the free and

beneficent constitution, which afforded the highest attainable security against the passage of unjust laws. He addressed himself, therefore, assiduously, and almost alone, to what seemed to him a duty of calling the American people back from revolutionary theories, to the formation of habits of peace, order, and submission to authority. He inculcated the duty of submission by states and citizens to all laws passed within the province of constitutional authority, and of absolute reliance on constitutional remedies for the correction of all errors, and the redress of all injustice. This was the political gospel of Daniel Webster. He preached it in season and out of season, boldly, constantly, with the zeal of an apostle, and with the devotion, if there were need, of a martyr. It was full of saving influences while he lived, and those influences will last so long as the constitution and the Union endure.

It remains that I make a few observations on the style of Mr. Webster's speeches. Style is to writings what manners are to the man, or what the cut is to a coat. It is the fashion of one's thoughts. Language is the fabric, and the book, the speech; the article, the made garment; and every writer is his own tailor. If he be a bungling workman, the cloth is spoiled; if skillful, the wonder is how so comely a garment could be made from such homespun stuff. Mr. Webster always preferred the homespun to the factory-made or imported article, but he was no bungler in making it up. And as a well-made garment always fits the person for whom it was designed, so a good style always fits the intellectual character of the writer. It is its very image and superscription. This is eminently the case with Mr. Webster's style. He copied no foreign modes, he sought no model out of himself, but simply sought to develop fitly and adequately what was in himself. His style is simply Daniel Webster embodied in speech. In the small space now left I shall not attempt fully to characterize that style, but simply to name two of its prominent qualities.

The first is its highly argumentative character. Mr. Webster does not, to be sure, make so much use of illative, causal and syllogistic words as some, but he is always reasoning, notwithstanding. The mere outward form and framework of reasoning, the mere array of "fors," and "therefores," and "consequentlys," which are but the stepping-stones in the ascent of reasoning, and which a master mind always dispenses with in a great measure, are by no means formidable in his speeches; but the real substance of reasoning is there, and is felt all the more for being disengaged from these dialectic clogs. Mr. Webster's speeches are always founded upon matter, not upon vacuity, as is the case with too many speeches. He always has an important subject, which he opens his way into further and further, every sentence he utters. He always has a goal before him, which he steadily keeps in view, and as steadily approaches at every step. He has a point to prove, and he is always proving it. There is no retrogression in his movements, no running off on tangents, no introduction of irrelevant matter, no excursions into the regions of fancy, no distracting array of learning, no bewildering coruscations of wit or of rhetoric, but simply straight-forward, pertinent, forcible argument — often brilliant, no doubt, often ornamented, but yet none the less solid argument. The great subject, tossed to and fro by his giant strength, and smitten now here and now there by his huge hammer, often rings with piercing echoes, and sends forth brilliant flashes of light, but they are drawn from the subject itself by the strength and skill of the workman — the light which is seen is the real, native light of the subject, and not mere fireworks. I should like to exhibit the

argumentative character of his style, by presenting an analysis of one of his great speeches, but space does not allow, and if it did, it would only be presenting a dry skeleton, instead of the living and life-giving form itself.

The other quality in Mr. Webster's style, which I here name, is its remarkable simplicity. There is nothing metaphysical, nothing stilted, and, generally, nothing elaborate about it. Not that Mr. Webster was wanting in metaphysical power, but that under the potent alchemy of his mind, abstractions were changed into concrete forms. It has been said that it takes time to be simple, and it might be added, that it takes talent, too. What a feeble mind works up to through complicated and laborious processes, spreading out a formidable array of stepping-stones, and formulas, and dialectic machinery of every sort, a powerful and well-trained mind grasps at once in its elementary forms, and presents it with all the simplicity of nature. Such, pre-eminently, as I conceive, was the process with Mr. Webster. His was a mind of gigantic strength, developed and directed by severe discipline and profound study. He had the requisite talent, and took the requisite time, to be simple. Compared with the metaphysical disquisitions of Calhoun, or the elaborate discourses of Burke, the speeches of Mr. Webster have full as much, and generally much more, solid thought, while they have the great advantage of being infinitely more simple and direct in their style. The business of the statesman is practical, and a statesman, to be a good one, must be a practical man, and have a plain, practical style of communicating his thoughts. In this Mr. Webster is unapproached, and almost unapproachable. There may be others who

equal him in the bare matter of simplicity, but for discussing a great or profound subject in all its fullness and completeness, according to a method and in language adapted to the comprehension of the humblest class of minds, I know of no equal. His style is almost conversational, and, indeed, quite so in parts of many of his speeches. He often seems to throw himself into a subject, and seize one fragment of it after another, and hold it up and talk about it, as a naturalist would about a mineral, till you see all its peculiarities, its angles of crystallization, its composition, and whole structure and history. He carries a strong business tact with him into his speeches. He has ideas which he is certain are valuable, and which he feels it is important that his hearers should understand and appreciate. He holds them up, therefore, to those around him, and expatiates upon their qualities earnestly and eloquently, and yet familiarly, as a merchant does upon his wares. This style of speaking may perhaps be thought by some to possess small merit compared with high-sounding and high-soaring oratory, and flowing, transcendent eloquence, but not by those experienced in public affairs. It is just what is needed, and just what does the work in deliberative bodies, and is worth more to a nation than oceans of phosphorescent rhetoric. The solidity and simplicity of Mr. Webster's style forms its crowning ornaments, and more than anything else accounts for his vast ascendancy over all the other statesmen and orators of our country.

But I must bring these observations to a close; and in doing so I feel how poor and meager they are, compared with the great subject to which they relate. Words cannot

convey an adequate conception of the eloquence of Daniel Webster. In order to have any just idea of it, one must have witnessed its display for himself. His great power of thought and language was sustained and seconded by a person, a voice and a bearing, such as rarely grace the forum. He had the body of Agamemnon and the voice of Nestor, with a solemn dignity of bearing peculiarly his own. Of immense solidity and firmness of attitude, he seemed, while speaking in the court or in the senate, not unlike one of those bronze statues of the monarch of the forests, which stand in the public squares of large cities, with a copious stream of limpid water issuing from the mouth for the cooling and refreshing of those around, and in which the only motion discoverable is that occasional jar and agitation caused by the uprising of the rushing waters, struggling to escape. The privilege of witnessing, in person, one of Mr. Webster's highest oratorical efforts, was always regarded as among the rarest sights in our land. To the cultivated man it was better than Franconia, Niagara, or the Mammoth Cave. But the opportunity for such a sight has passed away forever, and nothing is left to perpetuate the impression, but the poor words of those who have happened at some time to be favored with it. The great orator, with his statue-like form, his massive head, his jutting brow, his speaking eye, his commanding voice, and all that made him impressive to mortal sight, has gone down to the grave. He has taken his place among departed worthies, and has already become an historical character. And as we look back through the gallery of history, adorned at long intervals with the forms of the great, we seem to see no form taller or more majestic than

his. He moves with all the ease and dignity of conscious equality among the Demostheneses, the Ciceros, the Chathams and the Burkes of other ages, and not without some indications of superiority to them all. *Inter pares facile princeps.*

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

COLLEGE CHAPEL

FEB. 29, 1872

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.

PSALMS III. 10. *The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.*

THESE words have seemed to me as appropriate as any to the purpose which I have in view, of addressing you on the subject of Christian education. Systems of education, according to the prevailing spirit or element which characterizes them, may be divided into the scientific, the æsthetic and the Christian. To this list, indeed, might be added what is called practical education. This, however, is but a method, not a system, of education. It concerns the manner of imparting knowledge, or the aim kept in view, rather than the substance of the knowledge imparted. Practical education is opposed to theoretical education, and hence may be either the scientific, the æsthetic, or the Christian system carried out practically. Or, if in certain cases the term practical education has come to be used to designate the system of truths taught, it refers to such truths as are readily made practical, and then it would be little more than a subdivision of scientific education.

There are, then, properly speaking, but three systems of education — the scientific, the literary or æsthetic, and the Christian. Of these, the scientific relies chiefly upon the truths of science for furnishing and educating the mind. And by science is coming to be understood almost exclu-

sively physical science. Mathematics is scarcely embraced under it, except as an instrument for investigating the laws of nature, and as to metaphysics, it is wholly rejected. In short, the term science as now used means little more than what is known as positive science, which ignores all abstract conceptions, such as those of "attraction," "force," "causation"—whether first or final—and devotes itself wholly to facts, and their generalization by simple enumeration, according to their succession and similarity. The tendency of science, I say, is to this form, and, as far as it approaches it, a simple scientific education must appear to every one a very defective and incomplete means of culture. Is it enough for one to know simply the facts and laws of physical nature? to be able to recognize and classify the natural objects by which he is surrounded? to know what in experience will bring weal and what woe? Shall he not inquire also into the nature, origin and destiny of his own soul? Shall he not seek after God, if haply he may find him? May he not pry into the causes of things, and study their adaptations and design? There is here, it is obvious, a wide field untouched by science in its popular, accepted sense.

So also is a strictly literary or æsthetic education one-sided and incomplete. Such an education does not, it is true, wholly ignore the high problems just named, yet it attends to them, as well as to scientific questions, but incidentally. Its great instrument for educating the mind is art and letters. These letters may relate to any subject, provided it be viewed under the relations of taste. They may embrace science and metaphysics and theology in their

lighter and more attractive forms. All polite literature, whether in the form of philosophy, of history, of fiction, or of poetry, is pressed into its service. And with these, and the study of the fine arts, much undoubtedly may be done in furnishing and training the mind. But much also will remain undone; and especially the more robust and masculine powers of the mind will remain comparatively undeveloped — the powers of generalization and abstraction, of broad and comprehensive conception, and of high and subtle reasoning. Such a training may produce a refined and elegant culture, but will leave the mind impotent to grapple with the more profound and difficult questions which underlie all knowledge, or are connected with our being and destiny.

An æsthetic education, then, is not less defective than a mere scientific education, though in a different way each should be supplemented by the other, and to make the system perfect, both should be supplemented by a Christian education. And by Christian education I do not mean precisely what is sometimes expressed by it. I do not mean so much an education in the forms and details of Christianity, as an education which founds and proceeds upon some of its great fundamental principles — such as the existence of God as a creator and governor of the universe, the reality of design or final causes in the works of nature, the personality and immortality of the human soul, and the like. I am speaking of education in its public and general relations. The details of a Christian education belong to the family and the church; but a public education should at least recognize and rest upon its fundamental principles. And it is

remarkable that the above-named principles, and a few others like them, such as the reality of an external world, are what Dr. Reid calls principles of common sense, and appeals in their defense — successfully, as I think — to the common sense of mankind. By others they are called metaphysical and theological ideas, and by Kant, ideas of the pure reason. But, by whatever name they are called, they obviously lie at the foundation of all knowledge, and are essential to connect it together and give it coherence. If external nature, to adopt the definition of Mr. Mill, be nothing more than "a permanent possibility of impressions," and we ourselves only the correlative possibility of receiving or realizing these impressions, and God and Providence be merely the ceaseless and endless on-flowing of these impressions, given and received in orderly succession according to fixed laws, what is knowledge but the baseless fabric of a vision? In the language of Fichte, "All reality is converted into a marvelous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream of itself." And not only are these ideas necessary in order to give substance and coherence to knowledge, but they are of the very highest importance in their moral and disciplinary effect. What better, what more wholesome gymnastic is there for the mind, than is found in the investigation and study of these great ideas, so intimately connected with the origin, the existence and destiny both of ourselves and other things! Every system of knowledge or education, then, which excludes or ignores these ideas, is radically defective, and unworthy at least of a Christian country. Let us proceed now to a more detailed consideration of some of these fundamental truths.

I. Of the belief in the existence and providence of God. The existence of God has been said to be the condition of the possibility of all things. No God, no universe; no creator, no creation. But the Christian conception of God is not merely that of a creator, but of a kind, ever-present and ever-provident Father. He is represented in Scripture not only as the maker of all things, and of ourselves among other beings and things, but as sustaining all things in existence by the constant exertion of his power, and directing their movements by the constant exercise of his wisdom; as embracing in his Providence every movement in this vast scheme of things, and ordering them all for the best good of his intelligent creatures; as knowing our thoughts, words and deeds, and holding us responsible for the same; as compassionating our case as sinners, and making provision for our recovery from our lost estate; but that, although thus long-suffering and compassionate, yet, as our final judge, he will by no means spare those who persist in sin, but consign them to their just doom in another world. What a conception this! How admirably adapted to our condition! How encouraging to the right-minded, how deterrent to evil-doers! Obliterate it, and what a chasm, what a blank it leaves! And yet there are those who would obliterate it. And on what grounds?

Some say that they cannot find God. They look for him but they behold him not; they listen, but they hear not his voice; they search through nature, but they find no traces of him. To such the history of all growths and changes in the world, including races of men, animals, plants, and all other transformations which take place, are but genealogical

tables of succession, wherein one thing begets another, and so on indefinitely; yes, indefinitely, perhaps, but not on this account infinitely. These changes are all effects as well as causes, and effects, too, before they are causes, and however great their number, would not supply the necessary condition of a cause which is not also an effect. The chain is not only made up of finite links, but of links without a staple to fasten to. And then, are we sure that God does not intervene between the links, to form the connections throughout the whole length of the chain? Or, if it be said that these transitions from one thing to another are all made by forces inherent in nature itself, we may still inquire who put those forces there? Does matter generate force of itself? Are we to believe that all these powers of attraction and repulsion, that these affinities and repugnances which pervade nature, that the wonderful agencies of light, heat and electricity, that the myriad adaptations among objects, as of iron for the railroad track, of coal and wood for the generation of heat, of the horse for the bridle and his rider, the ox for the yoke, the eye for the light—are we to believe, I say, that all these are self-constituted and independent? Impossible! Is it not infinitely more probable that this scheme of men and things was made with mutual correspondences, so as to work together by a wise and beneficent creator?

To most men, I am persuaded, this seems vastly the more probable hypothesis. And yet there are some who appear to doubt it. For, say they, matter is eternal — it cannot be destroyed, it cannot be created. We may change its form, we may decompose it, we may burn it, we may evaporate it,

but we cannot destroy it, nor diminish nor increase its amount by a single particle. Very true, we cannot, but does this prove that God cannot? Indeed, this is begging the whole question, which is, whether the existence of matter, and the world as it is, do not require the supposition of a creator. We are brought back, then, to the point just considered, whether it is more probable that this scheme of things, including men, animals and other objects, with all their powers, properties, adaptations and correspondences, exist, and always have existed, independently and of themselves, or have been brought into existence, and sustained by an omnipotent creator. I trust there is no one present who has any doubt on this point. And yet it may not be amiss to glance for a moment at the way in which those who hold to the eternity of matter and reject the idea of a creator attempt to account for things as we find them. We find matter existing both as organized and unorganized, animate and inanimate, and with almost infinite variations under each of these forms. And the question is, how has matter attained these forms if there has been no creation. Why, say they, by a constant evolution from simpler to more complicated forms, and this by an internal power of its own. Unorganized matter somehow works itself up into organized, and organized matter into animate matter. Yes, somehow! but how they never have explained, and, I believe, never can. A most elaborate attempt, indeed, has been made to explain this evolution through the different forms of animate life, by Mr. Darwin and his followers, in their theory of the "Transmutation of Species." It is true that Darwinism is not necessarily atheistic, and yet it must

be apparent that that is its tendency. If existing species of plants and animals have sprung from a single original species by "natural variations and the survival of the fittest," why may not this original form of organic life have been evolved directly from inanimate matter?

And the theory is equally prejudicial to the doctrine of final causes. The lowest hypothesis which will satisfy the Christian idea of God is, that he concurs in all changes, or, in other words, that, if he has endowed matter with certain powers, these powers are not independent of himself—they must be sustained and seconded by him in order to be operative. Without this there is no room for such a thing as Providence. And not only so, but that he has made things with permanent adaptations, so as to serve given ends, which may be said to be the ground or cause of his having made them so. And what evidence has the vaunted theory of evolution presented, and what can it present, to show that these adaptations are not designed and permanent! Has it been able to point out any clear case—or any approach, even, to a clear case—of the transformation of species during either the historical or fossiliferous period? Does it not rather depend upon slight, local, exceptional cases of transformation, and from these leap to general conclusions, which are by no means warranted by the facts? And what advantage has the theory for the explanation of nature over the old idea of adaptation and design? Take, for instance, the giraffe—how does it happen that this animal has such an exceptionally long neck? The transmutation theory assumes that it has become so in the struggle for life, in other words, by the necessity for high feeding in

a country liable to droughts; in brief, indirectly at least, as the result of stretching. Now, what advantage philosophically has this view over that which regards this species of animal as made originally by an all-wise God for this very purpose, to get its sustenance from the shrubs and trees, while the other animals in the same *habitat* should feed upon the ground? And if philosophically the conception has no advantage over the common one, morally it is at a great disadvantage in the comparison, and on the score of probability also, as I believe.

Indeed, this argument from design and final causes, which is well-nigh robbed of all significance by the evolution theory, is perhaps the most striking and convincing of all the arguments for the existence of God. To design or conceive of ends and contrive means to attain those ends, is the distinctive act of human intelligence, and hence, when we discover in our own bodies and in other objects around us such striking evidences of design and adaptation of means to ends, we very naturally, and legitimately, too, ascribe them to a wise and beneficent creator. Thus the Apostle Paul, in the first of Romans, says, "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." So also the Psalmist: "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches." And again, "I will praise thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: marvelous are thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well." And who in studying his own frame, and contemplating the various aspects of nature, is not conscious of

similar sentiments struggling for utterance! What a piece of mechanism is the human body, furnished as it is with levers and joints and lubricating fluids! supplied with ducts, veins and arteries to nourish, with muscles to move, with bones to sustain and protect, with nerves to feel and flesh to round it out and make it a fit tabernacle for the indwelling of the spirit! The ancient Greeks, who had a lively perception of beauty and order, designated the universe by a word which embodied both these ideas — *cosmos*; and this has not been thought by one of the greatest naturalists of modern times an unsuitable title under which to publish to the world the results of his vast explorations through the realms of nature. “Beauty and order”; these are the grand characteristics of nature which meet us everywhere — whether we view a limited landscape, made up of hill and dale, forest and rippling stream; or traverse vast tracks of country diversified by mountain and prairie, lake and waterfall, and irrigated by great rivers, making their way to the ocean; whether we look out upon the earth clothed with verdure or sheeted with snow; whether we look up to the heavens studded with stars, or down into the deep sparkling with gems! And who but an all-wise and benevolent being could have so made and ordered all these things! Surely “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork.”

It is not pretended, of course, that the evidence of the existence of God is demonstrative, that is, so conclusive that the opposite is absolutely impossible. The question is not of a nature to admit that kind of proof — but the proof is next to that, it possesses the very highest degree of prob-

ability ; and the importance of the doctrine is so great that the slightest degree of probability in its favor should be sufficient to determine as to its acceptance. Hold on to this great idea, therefore, against all specious reasoning and against all solicitations of wicked men and wicked passions. Indeed, it is so fundamental, so primary in its nature, so essential to everything which deserves the name of knowledge or enters into our experience, that one cannot rest long in its rejection. If cast out it will return to haunt you, so that you must entertain it either as a reality or as a specter. Settle down upon it, then, as a finality, and conforming your lives to it, rest in it in peace and security !

II. But in addition to the doctrines of a first and of final causes, there is another fundamental Christian doctrine which it comes within the scope of the present discourse to consider, namely, the personality, the responsibility and immortality of the human soul. It is true that neither this nor the other doctrines named are exclusively Christian ; they were all held, with greater or less certainty, by many of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, to say nothing of other heathen writers. But they are adopted and set forth with much greater distinctness and prominence in the Scriptures, so much so, that of the doctrine now under consideration it is said, that "life and immortality are brought to light in the Gospel." And, as there could be no Savior if there were no God, so there could be no salvation if the soul were not immortal. These doctrines, therefore, are fundamental to Christianity, and hence deserve to be denominated Christian.

My exposition of the doctrine of immortality must neces-

sarily be brief. And it is not needful that much should be said in its defence. Our instincts all plead for immortality. Every one shrinks from the thought of annihilation — of perishing with the brutes. I am to speak, however, not simply of the immortality of the soul, but of our personality and responsibility. Immortality without personality would be merely endless existence, without any one to be interested in it. The immortality of the soul, unless that soul has a distinct, conscious personality, is no more than the immortality of the rocks and trees, and other unconscious things. Personality, then, supposes consciousness, and a unity and continuity of consciousness. It is a consciousness all one's own, the privy, if I may so say, to what is going on within a certain sphere, to which no other person has access. This is the first element of personality. A second element is, that this conscious being discriminates himself from other things — there is to him a me and a not me. He knows himself, and he knows other things as different from himself. A third element is the power of choosing and acting for himself. Such a self-conscious, self-discriminating and self-controlling existence is a person or individual. He is not to be confounded with things around him; he is no mere phenomenon, appearing and disappearing amid the transformations of nature, no mere waif thrown up from pantheistic depths, but a distinct, self-centered individual, the crowning work of creation, the noblest work of God. And having the power of knowing and choosing, of knowing the right and choosing it, of course he is responsible.

And can it be that such a being is made to endure but for

a day! Made in the image of God, why should not his existence run parallel with that of God? A person, a human being, has been defined as a soul served by a material organism. The organism, the body, may die, but why should this involve the death of the soul? Its dissolution, to be sure, removes to mere lookers-on the sensible evidence of the existence of the soul; but the body being of a different nature from the soul, as all the phenomena of life go to show, what destroys it would not be likely to destroy the soul. As the taking down of the scaffolding does not at all damage the house, but on the contrary only renders its fair proportions more striking, so we may well suppose that the dissolution of these limbs and external senses, which have been so helpful and essential to the soul in the experience of life in this material world, will be only disencumbering it of what has obscured its glory, and removing the only obstacle to a higher and more spiritual existence. Indeed, I see nothing incredible in the supposition of Bishop Butler, that the soul will be so little affected by the dissolution of the body as to pass through the crisis of death without the suspension of its usual processes of thinking, and thus, by the death of the body, be born directly into a new life. And surviving the death of the body, we can see nothing to limit its duration.

This, I am aware, is but a slight and very partial exhibition of the arguments for the immortality of the soul, and even were they all presented in their most convincing form, it is freely admitted, as in the previous case, that they would fall short of a perfectly demonstrative proof. The proof here also is merely probable, though in the highest degree so.

And this, as you are aware, is the case with most questions. Only questions of quantity admit of absolutely demonstrative proof. Hence all moral and religious questions, as well as most questions pertaining to practical life, are merely probable. Indeed, as observed by Bishop Butler, to man with his limited powers probability is the guide of life. And what is probability? When we pronounce any event or conclusion to be probable, we always mean that the preponderance of reasons seems to us to be in favor of such event or conclusion, as against any other. This preponderance may be greater or less in different cases, but in all cases, in order to constitute probability, it must be sufficient to incline the reason to a particular conclusion, and as reason is given us for a guide within its sphere, what convinces the reason should determine the conduct. If it do not, we show ourselves prejudiced and perverse.

Hence it is that so much stress is laid upon faith in the Scriptures. Faith, as far as it is a matter of the intellect, is belief, probable opinion, and is by no means confined to religious questions. The great metaphysical questions, which are fundamental to all science and life, such as the real, substantive existence of matter and of our own souls, as well as the existence of God, are matters of faith. They cannot be absolutely demonstrated; yet the indications are all in their favor, and meet upon all sides. They appeal to us through our senses, through our feelings and through our reason, so that we cannot long rest in their rejection. And so it is with strictly religious questions, such as our condemnation for sin under the law of God, the necessity of an atonement, the reality of a state of retribution in another

world, and the like. These questions meet us on every side, and solicit our attention and acceptance in ten thousand indescribable ways. We may try to disprove them, and think we have done so, but they will return in every hour of seriousness. They will be called up at innumerable points in the experience of life. The interest at stake being so great, we cannot and ought not to disregard the slightest probability in their favor. In religious matters, therefore, faith has great scope, and ought to have great influence with us.

Thus an education which rests upon the doctrines of first and final causes, and of the immortality of the soul, is at the same time an effectual discipline of that habit of mind which is concerned in Christian faith, and hence opens the way into the very heart of Christianity. Such an education, then, may well claim for itself the title of Christian, especially in these days, when there are so many who ignore or reject these doctrines, in their mad attempt to undermine the foundations of our religion. Let Christians, then, hold on to these doctrines all the more tenaciously, instil them carefully into the minds of their children, and see that they are inculcated in their institutions of learning. They are by no means the whole of religion, but they are essential as a foundation for it—the best possible safeguard, the surest anchorage for the mind to rest in. Being once intelligently received and vividly realized, they open the mind to the reception of the other truths of religion, and dispose the heart to receive them.







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